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We study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bar-
gaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long-run player
and a sequence of short-run players. The outside option is not only a disagreement point
but reveals information privately held by the long-run player. In equilibrium, the unin-
formed short-run players’ offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the
informed long-run player’s payoffs are discontinuous. The long-run player invokes inef-
ficient random outside options repeatedly in order to build reputation to a level where
the subsequent short-run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff, but he also
runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power. We investigate
equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness
of outside option diffuses. In both cases, bargaining outcomes become more inefficient
and the limit reputation building probabilities are interior.
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Many real world negotiations take place repeatedly in the shadow of outside options, such
as those provided by experts, arbitrators or even courts. Consider, for example, a firm that
is in disputes with its employees regarding wage increases or with its customers regarding
compensation for damages.1 These disputes often involve interaction between a single privately
informed long-run player and a sequence of short-run players. The recent high-profile litigations
surrounding Merck, a pharmaceutical firm, offer an interesting case in point. Merck refused
to settle and contested every case in court. After losing the first case with a compensation
verdict of $253 million in 2005, it continued to fight in court over the following two years. After
winning most of the cases, the firm ended up settling further 27,000 cases out of court for $4.85
billion in total, an amount far smaller than experts predicted at the beginning.2
In these examples, the bargainers obtain random outside options when they fail to reach
an agreement. Moreover, the outside option represents not merely a “disagreement point” in a
repeated setup; it can partially reveal the informed party’s private information. The decision on
whether to take the outside option must take into account not only the amount of information
that this decision will disclose per se but also learning from the subsequent realization of
uncertain payoffs. While the bargaining literature has long recognized the fundamental roles
played by outside options and incomplete information (e.g., Nash (1950, 1953), Harsanyi and
Selten (1972)), this linkage between the two essential ingredients of bargaining is yet to be
explored. Our goal is to investigate how the additional source of learning from random outside
options determines bargaining strategies and outcomes and to provide an analytical tool to
study other related repeated interactions.
We consider a discrete-time repeated bargaining model in which a long-run player (e.g., a
firm) bargains with a sequence of short-run players (e.g., customers or employees). In each
period, a new short-run player enters the game and the two parties bargain (e.g., over damage
compensation or wage increase). If they reach an agreement, the corresponding transfer is made
from the long-run player to the short-run player who subsequently leaves the game. If they
disagree, the players invoke an uncertain outside option (e.g., through a court verdict), which
is inefficient due to a deadweight cost. For each pair of long-run and short-run players, the
disagreement payoffs are drawn independently from a finite set according to a distribution that
takes one of two types, “good” or “bad”, and is privately known by the long-run player. The
long-run player has an incentive to build a reputation for having a good distribution of outside
1The sheer existence of collective governance arrangements such as courts is a demonstration of the promi-
nence of these applications.
2Source: New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/09/business/09merck.html
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options. We analyze the reputation equilibria in which the players’ strategies are functions of
reputation (i.e., posterior belief on the good type) and reputation is valuable.
Our first main results (Theorem 1 and Corollary 1) establish the existence of a reputation
equilibrium and its behavioral and payoff properties. Even though the short-run players are
unrestricted in the set of offers, their equilibrium offers respond discontinuously to the long-run
player’s reputation. We show that every reputation equilibrium features two threshold levels of
reputation, 0 < p∗ < p∗∗ < 1. When reputation falls between the two thresholds, the long-run
player always turns down the equilibrium demand and the inefficient random outside option
is invoked, and as a result, the belief updating process is driven solely by the realizations of
random signals. When reputation is above p∗∗, the long-run player accepts the short-run players’
low equilibrium demand. There is no further learning and bargaining outcome is efficient, but
the long-run player extracts the full benefits of reputation. When reputation is below p∗, the
long-run player randomizes, the outside option is invoked only occasionally, and the negative
reputational effect of an adverse signal is reduced, and may even be overturned, by the act of
rejection. The long-run player’s payoffs are discontinuous in his reputation.
The short-run player trades off the deadweight cost of disagreement and the high expected
outside option against the bad type. This trade-off endogenously determines p∗∗. By revealing
his private information, the long-run player relinquishes his bargaining power and the short-
run players extract all the surplus in the ensuing bargaining. Therefore, the long-run player’s
benefit from revealing his type is merely the payoff that the current short-run player is willing
to give up in order to induce acceptance: this amount equals the one-off deadweight cost that
the short-run player would eschew in the case of an agreement. The long-run player weighs this
one-off deadweight cost against the probability of building reputation to p∗∗ beyond which he
obtains a larger share of the surplus from each subsequent short-run player. Since the reputation
building probability is increasing in the prior belief, this trade-off endogenously determines p∗.
The precise calibration of the rate of information revelation plays a role in the determination
of equilibrium incentives in our model, as in Cramton (1984), Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987)
and Abreu and Gul (2000), among others. In our repeated setup, the possibility of learning from
random outside options gives rise to an additional incentive to reject a myopically attractive
offer: not only does the long-run player not reveal himself to be a bad type but he can get lucky
and increase his reputation. Thus, he can “gamble” his reputation at the expense of efficiency.
Indeed, this incentive dominates in the limit as we next show.
We establish the limit properties of reputation equilibria as the long-run player becomes
increasingly patient (Theorem 2). We first show that, as the discount factor δ goes to 1,
the limiting equilibrium outcome is unique: the lower reputation threshold p∗ converges to
0, while the upper threshold p∗∗ remains unchanged. Thus, as the long-run player becomes
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more patient, the players adopt incompatible bargaining postures, and inefficiency arises, over
a wider range of beliefs. Explicit bounds are derived for the equilibrium payoffs as well as for
the reputation building probability, i.e., the probability with which the posterior reaches the
upper threshold starting from prior p ∈ (0, p∗∗). As δ → 1, the accumulated signals become
increasingly informative and, consequently, reputation building is fast and incurs no discounting
cost, but the reputation building probability is interior: reputation can be built, though not
always. Nonetheless, the reputation gain is small at a low prior. These results on the long-run
distributions of payoff and belief contrast with the high payoff bounds established by Fudenberg
and Levine (1989, 1992) and the impermanence of reputation shown in Cripps, Mailath and
Samuelson (2004).3
We also explore the limiting equilibrium properties in a parametrized model where, as the
real time interval ∆ goes to 0, the value and informativeness of outside options shrink corre-
spondingly at the rate that keeps the discounted sum of payoffs and aggregate informativeness
over a unit of real time asymptotically constant. The reputation equilibrium is shown to be
unique for generic ∆ (Theorem 3). We obtain in closed-form the limit schedules of the reputa-
tion building probability and discounted payoffs. The reputation building probability is always
interior despite the fact that reputation building takes real time. As ∆ → 0, the one-off in-
centive offered by the short-run player to induce agreement vanishes and the long-run player’s
reputation concerns prevail. Consequently, the lower threshold p∗ again converges to 0, and the
equilibrium in the limit features only one threshold p∗∗. Diffusive outside options shut down the
signaling channel of information revelation and amplify the incentives to gamble reputation.
This contrasts with the equilibrium dynamics obtained by Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) and
Daley and Green (2012) in dynamic games where exogenous information arrives in a Brownian
motion.
Although we have chosen to present our analysis in a bargaining setup in which one party
pays the other and the offer space is unbounded, it can be readily adapted to a standard surplus-
splitting bargaining model. The presence of informative and random payoff realizations is a
salient feature of many repeated interactions beyond the bargaining setup that we consider, from
repeated sales between a long-lived seller and a sequence of short-lived buyers to entry deterrence
by an incumbent facing a series of potential entrants. With appropriate interpretations of
the disagreement points, the tools developed in this paper can be adapted to analyze such
applications, which we elaborate on in Section 6.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model of
repeated bargaining with random outside options. Section 3 presents our main results on
3See also Benabou and Laroque (1992) and Bar-Issac (2003) for related applications in which private infor-
mation is fully revealed in the long run.
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reputation equilibrium and its limit properties as δ goes to 1. Section 4 investigates the limiting
equilibrium when information diffuses. We discuss several extensions of our analysis as well as
the related literature in Section 5. Some concluding remarks are offered in Section 6. Formal
proofs are relegated to the Appendix, and the Supplemental Material (Lee and Liu (2013))
contains additional results and proofs that are left out for expositional reasons.
2 The Model
2.1 Repeated Bargaining with Outside Options
We consider a repeated bargaining model in discrete time. Periods are indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
A single long-run player 1 faces an infinite sequence of short-run players 2 with a new player 2
entering in every period.
The game within each period t is as follows. Player 2 makes a demand s ∈ R, which player
1 can accept or reject. If the demand is accepted, player 1 pays s to player 2 who then leaves
the game. If the demand is rejected, a transfer v ∈ R from player 1 to player 2 is drawn with
probability f θ (v) , where θ ∈ {G,B} is privately known by player 1. Let Eθ [v] denote the
expectation of v under f θ. This outside option is inefficient: it incurs a cost c > 0 to player 2
with the cost to player 1 normalized to 0.
Let pt ∈ [0, 1] denote player 1’s reputation, i.e., player 2’s belief on θ = G, at the beginning
of period t, with p0 ∈ (0, 1) being the commonly known prior. Players observe the realized
transfer and whether it results from voluntary agreement or outside option; rejected demand is
not publicly observable. Player 1 minimizes his repeated game expected transfers/payments to
the short-run players with a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).4 Each player 2 maximizes his stage-game
expected payoff.
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Full Support) fG and fB share a common support V ⊂ R, which is a finite
set with at least two elements.
Assumption 2 (Strict Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property) f
B(v)
fG(v)
is strictly increasing in v.
Assumption 3 EB [v]− EG[v] > c.
Assumption 1 ensures that no single realization of v can reveal player 1’s type. Assumption
4Whenever we refer to player 1’s “payoff” below, we mean the negative of his transfer.
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2 implies that higher realizations of v are more likely to arise from type B.5 Assumption 3 says
that the difference between the expected values of the outside option to player 2 from the two
player 1 types outweighs the cost; this provides an incentive for player 2 to induce the costly
outside option.
2.2 Strategies and Equilibrium
A Markov (behavioral) strategy of the short-run player, d, maps his belief to a probability
distribution over all possible demands, i.e., d : [0, 1] → 4(R). A Markov strategy of the long-
run player of type θ ∈ {G,B} is a function rθ that specifies a probability of rejection of each
demand at each belief, i.e., rθ : [0, 1] × R → [0, 1]. We write player 1’s discounted average
expected transfer to player 2 at belief p as Sθ(p). We suppress the dependence of Sθ on the
strategy profile and the discount factor to save on notation.




together with beliefs {pt} is a reputation equilibrium
if (i) it is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, (ii) Sθ (p) is non-increasing in p over [0, 1] , and (iii)
once player 1’s type is revealed, belief no longer changes.
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is defined in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). Even though they
only consider finite games, its extension to an infinite game is straightforward (see Ho¨rner and
Vieille (2009), for instance). Monotone equilibrium payoffs capture reputation as a valuable
asset. Similar monotonicity conditions are also invoked by Benabou and Laroque (1992) and
Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet (2009) in reputation setups and by Fudenberg, Levine and
Tirole (1987) in a single-sale bargaining setup. Assuming that belief does not change from
0 or 1 ensures that, once player 1’s type is revealed, the continuation game is played as if it
has complete information. This assumption is standard in dynamic Bayesian games, including
bargaining literature with payoff uncertainties. See No¨ldeke and van Damme (1990) for a
pathological example that can arise without the restriction.
In equilibrium, the short-run player can make a demand that will be rejected for sure; let
us refer to such a demand as a losing demand; a demand that is offered and accepted with
positive probability by either type of long-run player in equilibrium will be referred to as a
serious demand.





In this section, we investigate the dynamics of the reputation equilibrium of our bargaining
game. In a reputation equilibrium, once the long-run player has revealed his type θ ∈ {G,B},
each short-run player demands Eθ[v] and type θ accepts it for sure. Our results below are
concerned with behavior and payoffs at interior reputation levels.
Our first main result establishes that, with a sufficiently patient long-run player, a reputation
equilibrium exists, and every reputation equilibrium features two serious demands and two
threshold levels of reputation.
Theorem 1 There exists δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for any δ > δ¯, a reputation equilibrium exists,
and every reputation equilibrium admits only two serious demands, s∗ = EB[v] − c > s∗∗ =
EG[v], and two reputation thresholds, 0 < p∗ < p∗∗ = 1 − c
EB [v]−EG[v] , such that the following
hold:
(a) If p ∈ (p∗∗, 1) , s∗∗ is demanded and accepted by both types of player 1 for sure.
(b) If p ∈ (p∗, p∗∗) , losing demands are made and outside options are invoked for sure.
(c) If p ∈ (0, p∗) , s∗ is the only serious demand and is made with positive probability; type G
rejects every equilibrium demand; type B is indifferent between rejecting and accepting s∗
and rejection by type B occurs with positive probability.6
(d) At p∗, only losing demands are made; at p∗∗, player 2 is indifferent between losing de-
mands and s∗∗, which is the only serious demand and is accepted for sure by both types if
demanded.
Proof. See Appendices B and C.
Since acceptance of the higher serious demand leads to revelation of type B, we immediately
obtain from Theorem 1 the payoff implications below.
6There is, however, payoff-equivalent multiplicity regarding type B’s exact randomizing behavior in this
region of beliefs. For instance, there could be pˆ < p∗ such that, in (0, pˆ), rejection occurs with an interior
probability while, in [pˆ, p∗), rejection occurs with probability 1. See Appendix B.3 for more details and the Sup-
plemental Material (Section 2) for an example. Besides, for each equilibrium in which player 1 rejects a demand
with an interior probability, there are other outcome-equivalent equilibria involving player 2’s randomization
instead; see the Supplemental Material (Section 1.1).
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Corollary 1 For any reputation equilibrium with two thresholds, p∗ and p∗∗, established in
Theorem 1, we have the following:
(a) For any p ∈ (p∗∗, 1) , SB(p) = S = EG[v].
(b) For any p ∈ (0, p∗), SB(p) = S = EB[v]− (1− δ)c.
(c) For any p, SG(p) = S.
The reputation equilibrium in our model has the following noteworthy features. First, even
though the short-run players are not restricted in the set of demands, they do not adjust
their offers in order to induce acceptance and avoid the deadweight cost c of outside options.
Their equilibrium offers are inflexible and respond discontinuously to the long-run player’s
reputation, and this results in inefficiency of bargaining outcomes as well as discontinuity in
the payoffs. There is empirical support for this prediction of our model. For instance, in her
study of repeated shareholder litigations involving long-run underwriters, Alexander (1991)
finds that, beyond very few exceptions, the estimated strength of the case does not matter for
the settlement amount.
Second, the long-run player’s payoffs admit two flat boundaries: one at low reputation levels
and the other at high reputation levels. When reputation falls in the intermediate region, this
player’s bargaining posture resembles a gambling process: he refuses every equilibrium demand
and resorts to outside options, and his reputation evolves according to the realizations of random
signals until it settles at one of the two boundaries. These reputation dynamics provide one
possible explanation of the bargaining postures illustrated by our motivating example in the
Introduction. Facing a series of product liability litigations, the firm may have suffered damage
to its reputation by losing the first few cases in court but repeated gambles eventually proved
successful as later court victories propelled reputation to a level where all further cases settled
at a low amount.
Third, type G’s payment is equal to EG[v], his expected value of each outside option, at
all reputation levels. However, this results from voluntary agreement only when reputation
is above the upper threshold p∗∗. At lower reputation levels, type G rejects all equilibrium
demands and his transfers to the short-run players are determined by random outside options
drawn with distribution fG. Indeed, type G’s response to the cutoff level of demand EG[v]
depends on the reputation level and is determined endogenously in equilibrium.7
7This indeterminacy of type G’s response to the cutoff contrasts with the reputational bargaining literature
that assumes a behavioral type who follows a commitment cutoff strategy (e.g., Myerson (1991) and Abreu and
Gul (2000)). Indeed, one can construct equilibria in which EG [v] is demanded and rejected for sure at some
reputation levels, while it is demanded and accepted for sure at others. See Section 1.2 of the Supplemental
Material.
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The intuition behind the dynamics of the reputation equilibrium is as follows. First, when
reputation is high, the short-run player’s expected payoff from the outside option is low. Thus,
there exists a threshold level of reputation beyond which the incentive to avoid the deadweight
cost dominates and player 2 proposes a demand low enough to induce acceptance by both
types of player 1. This demand corresponds to s∗∗ and the threshold is p∗∗. Second, consider
the incentives when reputation is below p∗∗. For player 2, the expected value of the outside
option is high relative to the deadweight cost; this induces an aggressive demand that type G
rejects. Type B faces the following trade-off: the randomness of the outside option offers a
non-negligible chance of settling forever at a belief above p∗∗ with low future payments, but by
accommodating player 2’s demand and revealing his type, he could claim his contribution to
the total surplus, amounting to the one-off saving of the deadweight cost c. When reputation
is close to p∗∗, the benefit from gambling with random outside options dominates. The lower
threshold p∗ is then determined by the balance between the one-off saving of the deadweight cost
and the benefit from gambling reputation. Finally, when reputation is below p∗, equilibrium
requires that player 2’s demand leaves type B indifferent. Since acceptance of any demand
higher than s∗∗ leads to revelation of type B, the corresponding serious demand is s∗ which
does not respond to reputation.
We next provide an outline of our constructive proof. The equilibrium value function is
discontinuous and admits two fixed payoff boundaries: one for p < p∗ (equal to S) and the other
for p > p∗∗ (equal to S). The task boils down to identifying the lower reputation threshold
p∗ and the short-run player’s randomization at p∗∗. Formally, we define, for each α ∈ [0, 1] , a
contraction mapping Tα on type B’s value function S as follows:
[Tα (S)] (pt) =

EB[v] if pt = 0
min
{
S, (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [S (pt+1) |pt]
}
if pt ∈ (0, p∗∗)
αEG[v] + (1− α) [(1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [S (pt+1) |pt]] if pt = p∗∗
S if pt > p
∗∗
The equilibrium properties stated in Theorem 1 motivate the definition of Tα above, in
which α corresponds to the randomization at p∗∗, and the second line is set up to determine p∗.
We show that each Tα admits a unique fixed point Sα, which is a candidate equilibrium value
function, and p∗ (α) := sup
{
p : Sα (p) = S
}
is a candidate for the lower reputation threshold.
(For more details, see Appendix C.1: From Equilibrium Contraction Mapping.)
Then, we verify that there indeed exists an α ∈ [0, 1] such that the fixed point Sα together
with p∗ (α) correspond to a reputation equilibrium of the following kind: at p ∈ (0, p∗(α)), type
B plays a mixed strategy such that the posterior right after the rejection but before the outside
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option is exactly p∗(α), and SB (p∗ (α)) = S. (See Appendix C.2: From Contraction Mapping
to Equilibrium.)
3.2 Limit Properties: δ → 1
Our next main result concerns the properties of reputation equilibrium as player 1 becomes
increasingly patient. We examine both equilibrium strategies and payoffs.
Starting from belief p ∈ (0, p∗∗), let R(p) denote the probability with which reputation
reaches (i.e., hits exactly or moves above) p∗∗ in equilibrium. We suppress the dependence of
R on δ to save on notation. Note that, when it falls below p∗ in equilibrium, reputation can
still bounce back to p∗ via player 1’s own randomization after which gambling can occur again;
R(p) takes this into account.


























, where v = minV.
Theorem 2 For each δ, fix a reputation equilibrium with two reputation thresholds p∗ and p∗∗.
We have the following:
(a) “Limit Uniqueness”: limδ→1 p∗ = 0.
(b) “Reputation Building Probability”: For any p ∈ (0, p∗∗), limδ→1R(p) exists and
lim
δ→1
R(p) ∈ [ρλ(p)−λ∗∗−λ, ρλ(p)−λ∗∗] ⊂ (0, 1).
















Proof. See Appendix D.
Part (a) shows that in any limiting reputation equilibrium the lower threshold p∗ converges
to 0, and p∗∗ is independent of δ by Theorem 1. Therefore, in the limit, disagreement occurs and
inefficient outside options are invoked for all p ∈ (0, p∗∗), while agreement is achieved and the
bargaining outcome is efficient for p > p∗∗. Except at p∗∗, the equilibrium outcome is uniquely
determined.
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Part (b) obtains tight bounds on the reputation building probability. As δ → 1, the ac-
cumulated signals become increasingly informative, but the reputation building probability is
interior starting from any prior p ∈ (0, p∗∗): reputation can be built, though not always. As
p→ 0, λ(p)→ −∞ and hence ρλ(p)−λ∗∗ → 0, i.e., the reputation building probability becomes
arbitrarily small.
Part (c) further shows that type B’s payment in the limit is the weighted average between
EG[v] and EB[v] with the reputation building probability as the coefficient on the former.8
Combined with part (b), this implies that even though the reputation building probability
is strictly interior, conditional on the event that reputation is built, the speed of reputation
building is fast relative to δ → 1 and there is no discounting cost in the limit. Furthermore,
as p → 0, the limit payment converges to EB[v]: at a very low prior, reputation building is
essentially futile in terms of payoff gain.
Example 1 Let V = {0, 2, 4}, c = 1
10
, fG(0) = fB(4) = 10
27





. Then, p∗∗ = 0.6625 and ρ ' 2.7287. Figure 1 plots the bounds on the limit
reputation building probability established in Theorem 2 above.



















Figure 1: Bounds on reputation building probability
8There are countably many p < p∗∗ that can be reached from p∗∗ after a finite path of signal realizations.
For these beliefs, SB (p) depends on SB (p∗∗) that is in general not the same as EG [v] due to player 2’s
randomization.
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4 Informativeness of Outside Options
In the previous section, we took δ → 1 but kept the signal structure fixed as in the traditional
repeated game and reputation literature (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1992)). An equivalent way
of interpreting δ is to fix the interest rate r > 0 and treat the real time interval ∆ > 0 between
fixed actions as a parameter: δ = e−r∆. However, in our model, as δ → 1 or ∆ → 0, outside
options arrive more frequently and the aggregate precision of signals within unit time explodes.
In this section, we investigate the limit properties of our model while keeping asymptotically
constant the aggregate informativeness of signals within a unit of real time.
We focus on a symmetric binary case of our model. Let the repeated bargaining game
be played in discrete periods in real time t = 0,∆, 2∆, . . .. The set of outside options is








. Hence, EG [v] = −µ∆ and
EB [v] = µ∆. Both Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied; we take c = 2µ∆
κ
for some constant
κ > 1, in accordance with Assumption 3 (i.e., EB [v]−EG [v] = 2µ∆ > 2µ∆
κ
= c). We suppress
the dependence on ∆ to simplify notation.
This parametrization corresponds to the binary approximation of a Brownian motion: the
sum of signals per unit of real time is approximately normal with a type-dependent mean (−µ
for type G and µ for type B) and a type-independent variance (normalized to 1); see, for
example, Cox and Miller (1965). The discounted sum of expected outside option payments for
the two types in the limit are lim∆→0
EG[v]






Recall that Theorem 1 obtains properties of all reputation equilibria. However, multiple
equilibria could arise due to the long-run player’s randomization below the lower threshold
and the short-run player’s randomization exactly at the upper threshold. In the parametrized
model, we can strengthen Theorem 1 into the following.
Theorem 3 Consider the symmetric binary model parametrized by ∆. There exists ∆ > 0 such
that the reputation equilibrium outcome is unique for all but at most countably many ∆ < ∆.
In the generically unique equilibrium with two reputation thresholds p∗ and p∗∗, we have the
following:
9Our parametrization differs from the treatment in several other papers that investigate discrete-time ap-
proximations of continuous-time repeated games. Fudenberg and Levine (2007, 2009), for instance, fix the stage
game payoffs and let signals diffuse by letting ∆ → 0. See also Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) for the
case of Poisson signals. In these models, signals are informative about action choices but do not directly affect
stage-game payoffs. In our game, v serves as both signal and payoff. Indeed, if we fix V to be independent of
∆, the discounted average payoffs for both types are finite but collapse into the same level while the discounted
sum of payoffs explodes. However, the limiting properties are well-defined. See Lee and Liu (2012) for a formal
analysis.
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(b) At p∗∗ = κ−1
κ
, which is independent of ∆, player 2’s mixing probability is uniquely deter-
mined.
Proof. See Appendix E.
With symmetric binary signals, the equilibrium value function over the intermediate levels
of reputation (p∗, p∗∗) is recursively written as the following second-order difference equation












where, from pn, the posterior after a favorable (unfavorable) signal is pn+1 (pn−1). This can be
solved explicitly with the two payoff boundaries S and S, as illustrated in Figure 2 below. The
explicit derivation of the equilibrium value function can be further exploited to pin down the









Figure 2: Equilibrium value function with symmetric binary signals
As before, we denote by R(p) the probability that, starting from p ∈ (0, p∗∗), reputation
hits or goes above p∗∗ in equilibrium. Note that R(p) is a function of ∆.
Theorem 4 Consider the generically unique reputation equilibrium of the symmetric binary
model parametrized by ∆. We have the following:
10There are alternative ways to parametrize the symmetric binary case of our model, for which generic
uniqueness can be obtained similarly.
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(a) lim∆→0 p∗ = 0.
(b) For any p ∈ (0, p∗∗), lim∆→0R(p) = 1κ−1 p1−p ∈ (0, 1).
































1− e−r∆ = µ and lim∆→0
rSB(p∗∗)
1− e−r∆ = −µ.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Theorem 4 is the counterpart of Theorem 2. The new results simultaneously take limits on
signal precision as well as the long-run player’s patience, while Theorem 2 considers the limit
only on patience. We explain below the role of signal diffusion by comparing the driving forces
behind the two theorems.
In Theorem 2 above, increased patience puts a greater weight on the low future payments
above p∗∗, and since the aggregate informativeness of signals in a unit time explodes as ∆→ 0,
reputation building, if it occurs, is fast in real time; in the limit, there is no discounting cost.
If signal precision decreases with ∆, however, reputation building takes real time. Nonetheless,
since the sum of signals per unit of time is informative even as ∆ → 0, reputation building
must happen with positive probability for a finite amount of real time. For the same reason, the
difference between the two types’ discounted sum of payments does not disappear as ∆ → 0.
Thus, despite the fact that the discounting cost is positive for any fixed interest rate r, the
benefit of reputation building does not vanish.
Regarding the cost of reputation building, note that, in our infinitely repeated game, choos-
ing not to gamble leads to the revelation of type B and a constant flow of high payment
thereafter. Since the high serious demand is less than the expected value of the outside option
by c, the benefit of opting out of gambling is just the one-off saving of c, which vanishes with
∆. It follows that, just as in Theorem 2, the incentive to gamble reputation dominates for any
p < p∗∗ as ∆ becomes small.
We derive the limit reputation building probability in closed form. In contrast to Theorem
2, reputation building takes real time here, and hence, to obtain limit payoffs, we compute the
14









Comparing the discounted reputation building probability with its undiscounted counterpart




1−p , and in addition, Rˆ (p)→ 1κ−1 p1−p as r → 0. It is also shown that the value function in
the limit is continuous everywhere even though it is a step function for any fixed ∆ > 0.
Example 2 Let µ = 0.2 and κ = 5. Then, p∗∗ = 0.8. Figure 3 plots the undiscounted
reputation building probability (r = 0) against the discounted reputation building probability at
r = 0.05; Figure 4 simulates type B’s limit payments at r = 0 and at r = 0.05.

























In this section, we discuss several extensions of our analysis above and relate our contributions
to the existing literature in more detail.
5.1 Extensions
Non-Markov Equilibria. In our analysis, we have restricted attention to strategies that condition
actions only on the reputation level of the long-run player at each history. This enables us
to highlight the role of reputation in shaping outcomes of the repeated interactions that we
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Figure 4: Payment, lim∆→0
rSB(p)
1−e−r∆
consider. If we allow for non-Markov strategies, many new equilibrium possibilities arise in our
repeated game. To see this, note that, when player 1’s type is known, our model admits a folk
theorem: when p = 0, any payment in the closed interval
[
EB[v]− c, EB[v]] can be supported
by a subgame perfect equilibrium. Then, by simply allowing for non-Markov behavior after
the bad type reveals himself, our equilibrium construction can be extended to deliver a wider
range of equilibrium payoffs. Formal details of these non-Markov equilibria appear in the
Supplemental Material (Section 3.1).
Non-Monotone Equilibria. In a reputation equilibrium, the long-run player’s payoffs (pay-
ments) are monotone increasing (decreasing) in reputation. Since the good type’s equilibrium
expected payment at p = 1 is equal to EG[v], i.e., the expected value of his outside option, the
monotonicity property then implies that SG(p) = EG[v] for all p ∈ [0, 1], and this endogenizes
the stationary cutoff demand equal to EG[v]. It turns out that the precise details of our equi-
librium dynamics change if the restriction is relaxed. In the Supplemental Material (Section
3.2), we construct examples of non-reputation equilibria with non-monotone payoffs. By allow-
ing type G to adopt non-stationary cutoffs, it is shown that both long-run types’ equilibrium
payments could oscillate.
(Un)observability of Demands. We have assumed that the details of bargaining are observ-
able if and only if there is an agreement. This assumption is consistent with many applications.
For instance, in the cases of shareholder-auditor bargaining documented by Alexander (1991)
and Palmrose (1991), the details of disagreement are private information and the terms of
agreement are publicly observable. We can also extend our model by considering voluntary
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disclosure of an accepted demand and/or voluntary concealment of a rejected demand. Our
equilibrium is robust under the following natural specification of beliefs upon observing a con-
fidential agreement or open disagreement: player 2 assigns probability 1 to the bad type. This
equilibrium survives refinements such as the intuitive criterion. This argument eliminates any
benefit of confidentiality and suggests that other factors not captured in the current model are
responsible for confidential agreements observed in the real world. For example, a confidential
agreement may reduce the arrival of new disputes. On the other hand, allowing for observability
of rejected demands brings about a fresh signaling issue.
5.2 Related Literature
Bargaining. The bargaining literature has long recognized the fundamental roles of outside
options and incomplete information in determining bargaining strategies and outcomes. The
study of outside option in bargaining dates at least back to Nash (1950, 1953); the previous
bargaining literature on incomplete information has focused on the role of private information
about valuations (e.g., Cramton (1984), Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986) and Chatterjee
and Samuelson (1987)), patience (e.g., Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987) and Abreu, Pearce
and Stacchetti (2012)) or bargaining postures (e.g., Myerson (1991), Abreu and Gul (2000) and
Abreu and Pearce (2007)). These models consider negotiations over a single sale.
In this paper, we explore an interplay between outside options and incomplete information
in a repeated bargaining model: outside options provide informative signals and determine the
players’ immediate disagreement payoffs. Part of the mechanics of incomplete information in
our paper is not new. When players have private information about their outside options, their
decisions on whether or not to take the outside option must take into account the amount of
information that this decision will disclose. Cramton (1984) and Chatterjee and Samuelson
(1987), who consider private information about valuations instead, also analyze bargaining
models in which a precise calibration of the rate of information revelation plays a role in the
determination of equilibrium incentives. The distinct aspect of our model is the learning from
random outside options and strategic responses in a repeated setup, which give rise to the
gambling phenomenon. Indeed, as shown in Theorems 2 and 4, this phenomenon prevails in
the limit.
A different kind of linkage between outside options and incomplete information in single-
sale bargaining is considered by Compte and Jehiel (2002) who show that introducing outside
options into the Myerson-Abreu-Gul setup of single-sale bargaining with commitment types may
cancel out the delay and inefficiency that such informational asymmetry otherwise generates.
Atakan and Ekmekci (2012) consider a search market as a way of endogenizing outside options
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and explore the role of reputation.
Reputation. Two aspects of our model differentiate our analysis from the canonical reputa-
tion approach of Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992). First, the long-run player in our model
has private information about his payoffs rather than bargaining posture. Thus, this player
builds a reputation for having a strong outside option rather than being insistent.11 Second,
we have informative outside options, and this makes the reputation building for the bad type
essentially futile with a very small prior: Corollary 1 shows that the reputation gain amounts
only to the one-off cost of the outside option, i.e., (1− δ)c.
To bring our analysis closer to Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992), we could assume an
insistent type who accepts a demand if and only if it is no larger than some cutoff C, and
make outside options uninformative such that fB = fG with expectation E[v].12 This is
a Fudenberg-Levine-style model but its stage game has the following features. First, it is an
extensive form game. Second, not all of the long-run player’s strategies are identifiable since only
actual transfers are observed. Third, the Stackelberg strategy is not well-defined since the most
aggressive insistent strategy (i.e., cutoff equal to E[v] − c) makes player 2 indifferent between
offering a compatible demand and a losing demand; hence, one should consider C > E[v]−c. In
the Supplemental Material (Section 4), we obtain a payoff bound similar to that of Fudenberg
and Levine (1989, 1992) under Markov assumption.13 This direct comparison between our
model and the alternative model confirms that informative outside options are indeed the
source of the low reputation benefit.
Exogenous Information in Dynamic Games. Our model is closely related to Gul and Pe-
sendorfer (2012) who study a dynamic model of political campaigns where the exogenous signal
is a Brownian motion. With asymmetric information, the equilibrium in their model is char-
acterized by two cutoff levels of the median voter’s belief: one cutoff delineates the region of
hard information provision from that of signaling through mixed actions and the other cutoff
is the belief at which the voter is convinced of the candidate’s policy. While the equilibrium
of our discrete-time model resembles this equilibrium, our continuous-time limit, with signals
parametrized to approximate a Brownian motion, is different: Theorem 4 shows that there is
only one threshold p∗∗ in the limit. Indeed, this distinction reveals a different force behind our
bargaining game. In Gul and Pesendorfer (2012), stopping the arrival of external information
11In our model, a specific cutoff strategy is derived for type G but his response to the cutoff itself is flexible.
See Appendix A.2.
12Uninformative outside options violate Assumptions 2 and 3. Hence, the alternative model is not a limit of
our model as outside options become less informative. This is also confirmed in Section 4.
13Schmidt (1991) considers reputation in a finite horizon repeated bargaining model without informative
outside options.
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saves the accumulated cost of future information provision. In contrast, in our repeated bar-
gaining setup, the decision to stop gambling reveals the type and confers the bargaining power
to the short-run players who extract all gains from trade in the continuation game. Hence, the
cost saving is only the one-off amount equal to c, which vanishes in the continuous-time limit.14
The dynamic signaling model of Daley and Green (2012) contains a similar equilibrium
structure in which exogenous signals drive the belief process between two thresholds. This pa-
per further differs from ours because the two thresholds in their equilibrium are simultaneously
determined by the informed seller’s trade-off between delayed trade of a single asset and high
competitive prices at high beliefs. See Kremer and Skrzypacz (2007) for another dynamic sig-
naling model with exogenous information. Repeated models with exogenous signals in discrete
time are analyzed by Benabou and Laroque (1992), Bar-Isaac (2003) and Mathis, McAndrews
and Rochet (2009). These studies derive reputation dynamics in which the informed long-run
player draws random signals above an endogenously determined threshold but any reputation
built in this process must eventually disappear.
In all aforementioned works, with the exception of Gul and Pesendorfer (2012), the informed
player faces a competitive price environment and hence his payoff responds continuously to the
belief. In contrast, the uninformed players in our bargaining model are fully strategic, and the
signals are themselves disagreement payoffs; beliefs are updated from the realized transfers.
These features are not only relevant for applications, but they are of conceptual importance be-
cause studying strategic price formation is a prime motivation of bargaining models. Indeed, we
obtain the following important implication from strategic uninformed players: their equilibrium
offers change only discretely to reputation, even though there is a priori no constraint on the
offer space.15 Moreover, in the discrete-time model, this results in the long-run player’s value
function being discontinuous. All these issues pose analytical challenges in our model. The
incentives of the short-run players determine the two fixed boundaries of the long-run player’s
equilibrium value, as well as the upper threshold p∗∗, and the precise details of the short-run
player’s mixing at p∗∗ are critical for matching the gambling process with the equilibrium value
function.
14Note that we have normlized the long-run player’s cost of the outside option to be zero. This is without
any loss since otherwise the short-run players would also extract this cost saving once the long-run player has
revealed his type.
15See Alexander (1991) for empirical support of this prediction of our model.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we demonstrate the role of informative outside options in determining reputation
dynamics in a repeated bargaining model. The possibility of learning from the informative
outside options gives the long-run player with weak outside options an additional incentive to
reject a myopically attractive offer: not only does he not reveal himself to be the bad type, he
can also get lucky and improve his reputation if the signal happens to be favorable. Thus, he
can gamble his reputation. Nonetheless, at a very low prior, reputation building is essentially
futile in terms of payoff gain.
A direction to enrich our analysis would be to explore the interaction between the reputation
dynamics and detailed institutional features of the application. For instance, our bargaining
setup could be extended to address other potentially relevant features of negotiation, from
coalition formation (e.g., class action) to other more complex bargaining protocols and outside
option processes (e.g., strategic third party). Another interesting direction for future research is
to consider a long-lived uninformed player, which would generate a tension between incentives
for experimentation versus reputation building with informative signals.
The tools developed in this paper can be applied to analyze other repeated interactions
where informative and random payoff realizations give rise to incentives for the gambling repu-
tation phenomenon with two fixed payoff boundaries. We wrap up the paper by selecting and
discussing some examples below.
Repeated Sales. A seller serves a sequence of identical buyers. The seller privately knows
his unit production cost, which is either high or low. Each buyer only consumes one unit of
the product and his valuation is commonly known to be higher than the high cost. Each buyer
makes an offer. A disagreement invokes a random and fair but imperfect third party arbitration
that results in an informative signal about the seller’s private cost.16 Applying our analysis
to this model, we will obtain gambling reputation dynamics: transactions are conducted with
direct involvement of third parties when the belief on the high cost seller lies between two
thresholds, while the low cost seller bets his reputation until it reaches one of the boundaries.
Entry Deterrence. An incumbent faces a sequence of potential entrants over spatially sep-
arated markets. The incumbent has private information about technology or consumer brand
loyalty, and this stochastically affects the parties’ profits. Each entrant decides whether to enter
and the incumbent decides whether to start a price war. We can interpret entry as “disagree-
ment” and the profits after entry as “informative outside options.” Applying our analysis to
this model, we will again derive gambling dynamics: entry is deterred only when the incum-
bent’s reputation is high, and the incumbent will fight for sure when the reputation is between
16Gambetta (1993) and Dixit (2009) report an intriguing example of the Sicilian Mafia’s role as an arbitrator.
20
two thresholds, betting on the random payoffs to improve his reputation. We emphasize the
difference between this model and the standard chain-store model a` la Kreps and Wilson (1982)
and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). In the above model, the incumbent is not building a repu-
tation for being tough per se. Such an incumbent will not scare the entrant away; rather, the
incumbent is building a reputation of having a superior technology or high consumer loyalty,
convincing the potential entrants that entry will not be profitable.
Appendix
A Preliminary Results
In this section, we offer several preliminary results of our analysis that will be utilized later.
Also, throughout the rest of the paper, we introduce the following notation. Let v and v denote
the largest and smallest elements in V , respectively. Also, let v∗ ∈ V be such that fB(v)
fG(v)
≥ 1 if
v > v∗ and f
B(v)
fG(v)
< 1 if v ≤ v∗. The existence of v∗ is ensured by Assumption 2.
A.1 Stopped Martingale
Consider an auxiliary belief updating process {pt}∞t=0 starting from a prior p0 that is driven by
the realizations of outside options according to the true distribution fB. Then, by Bayes’ rule,




ptfG (v) + (1− pt) fB (v) . (3)
Fix p∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) . Let the stopping time τ designate the first time such that pt ≥ p∗∗. Let M (p0)
be the probability with which τ <∞, i.e., pt reaches p∗∗ in finite time.
Lemma 1 limp0→0M (p0) = 0.
































1−pt is a martingale and
pt∧τ
1−pt∧τ is a stopped martingale, where t ∧ τ := min {t, τ} .
By the definition of stopping time τ , (4) , and the (strict) monotone likelihood ratio property
(MLRP), pt∧τ





. Therefore, by the martingale stopping theorem


































It follows that limp0→0M (p0) = 0.
A.2 Serious Demands
Here, we present some useful properties of the players’ behavior in a reputation equilibrium.
Let us begin with type G’s equilibrium strategy: type G rejects any demand strictly above
EG [v], i.e., his outside option value, while accepting any demand strictly below it.17
Lemma 2 In any reputation equilibrium, for any p ∈ (0, 1), rG (p, s) = 0 if s < EG [v] and
rG (p, s) = 1 if s > EG [v] .
Proof. When player 1 is known to be type G, i.e., when p = 1, the unique reputation
equilibrium is such that player 2 demands EG [v] and player 1 accepts a demand if and only if
it is less than or equal to EG[v]. Hence, SG (1) = EG[v]. By monotonicity of SG(p), therefore,
every reputation equilibrium is such that SG (p) ≥ EG[v] for all p ∈ [0, 1] . By always rejecting
player 2’s demands, G can guarantee EG[v] as the (discounted average) expected transfer. It
therefore follows that SG (p) = EG[v] for all p ∈ [0, 1] .
Now, suppose that player 2 demands s < EG[v] at some history. Accepting s yields an
expected transfer equal to (1 − δ)s + δEG[v] < EG[v], while rejection yields (1 − δ)EG[v] +
δEG[v] = EG[v]. Thus, G must accept s for sure. A similar argument shows that G must reject
s > EG[v] for sure.
We next derive the following property of type B’s equilibrium strategy.
17Recall that the long-run player’s cost of the outside option is normalized to 0.
22
Lemma 3 Fix any δ and any reputation equilibrium. Also, fix any p, and consider any equilib-
rium demand s > EG[v] that could be offered at this history. If B’s equilibrium strategy accepts
s with a positive probability, then it accepts any s′ < s for sure.
Proof. Note that rejected demands are not observable. Let X denote B’s expected transfer
from rejecting any demand at this history. By Lemma 2, accepting s reveals that player 1 is B
and hence yields an expected transfer equal to (1− δ)s + δEB[v], which is at most X since B
weakly prefers to accept s.
Suppose that another demand s′ < s is offered on or off the equilibrium path. Since, by
monotonicity, SB(p) ≤ SB(0) = EB[v] for all p, B’s expected transfer from accepting s′ is at
most (1− δ)s′ + δEB[v] < X. Thus, B must strictly prefer to accept s′.
Our next lemma concerns the short-run player’s equilibrium demand. If player 1 is patient
enough, there are only two serious demands despite the fact that a priori player 2 has the option
to demand anything in the real line. Any other demands must be either off the equilibrium
path, or offered and rejected for sure in equilibrium.
Lemma 4 (Serious Demands) Fix any δ > c
EB [v]−EG[v]+c , and consider any reputation equi-
librium. A serious demand at any p ∈ (0, 1) is either EG[v] or EB [v]− c.
Proof. We prove Lemma 4 by way of contradiction. Fix any p. Let s be a serious demand
at p. We consider the following cases.
Case 1: s < EG[v].
But then, by Lemma 2, G accepts s and, hence, SG(p) = (1− δ)s + EG[v] < EG[v], which
contradicts that SG(p) = EG[v] for all p.
Case 2: s > EB[v].
By Lemma 2, for s to be a serious demand, B must accept s. Since accepting s > EB[v]
reveals B, B’s subsequent expected transfer as of the next period is EB[v]. If B rejects s, his
current period expected transfer is EB[v] < s, while future transfers are bounded above by
EB[v]. Therefore, B must strictly prefer to reject s, a contradiction.
Case 3: s ∈ (EG[v], EB[v]− c).
But then, consider player 2 demanding EB[v] − c instead of s. Player 2’s expected payoff
from the deviation is p
(
EG[v]− c)+(1−p) (EB[v]− c) since, by Lemma 2, G rejects EB[v]−c
for sure and B’s rejection also yields EB[v] − c in expectation. Note that G also rejects s for
sure and hence B accepts s < EB[v] − c with a strictly positive probability by assumption.
Thus, the deviation is profitable, a contradiction.
Case 4: s ∈ (EB[v]− c, EB[v]] and B rejects s with probability rB ∈ (0, 1).
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But then, consider player 2 demanding s−ε > EB[v]−c for some ε ∈ (0, rB (s− EB[v] + c)).
By Lemma 2, G rejects this for sure while, by Lemma 3, B accepts this for sure. Hence, player
2’s expected payoff from this deviation is p
(
EG[v]− c)+ (1− p)(s− ε), while the payoff from s
is p
(
EG[v]− c)+ (1− p)(1− rB)s+ (1− p)rB (EB[v]− c). Since ε < rB (s− EB[v] + c), such
a deviation is profitable, a contradiction.
Case 5: s ∈ (EB[v]− c, EB[v]] and B accepts s for sure.
We proceed in the following steps.
Step 1 : If there is another equilibrium demand s′ 6= s, then s′ = EG[v].
Proof of Step 1. Suppose not; so, s′ 6= EG[v] is offered in equilibrium. There are several
cases to consider here.
(i) s′ < EG[v] or s′ ∈ (EG[v], EB[v]− c)
In this case, by Lemma 3, B accepts s′ for sure. But we have already shown in Cases 1 and
3 above that this cannot be possible.
(ii) s′ ∈ (EB[v]− c, s)
We know from Lemmas 2 and 3 that G rejects s′ for sure, while B accepts it for sure. Thus,
player 2 strictly prefers to demand s over s′, a contradiction.
(iii) s′ > s
In this case, s′ must be accepted by B since, otherwise, player 2 obtains
p
(
EG[v]− c)+ (1− p) (EB[v]− c) ,




EG[v]− c)+ (1− p)s.
But then, by Lemma 3, any s′−ε ∈ (s, s′) is accepted for sure by B and we can invoke arguments
similar to those for Case 4 above to show the existence of a profitable deviation for player 2, a
contradiction.
Step 2 : Rejection reveals G.
Proof of Step 2. This follows immediately from Step 1 and Lemmas 2 and 3.
Now, by Step 2, the expected transfer from rejection equals
(1− δ)EB[v] + δEG[v], (5)
while that from accepting s, since this reveals B, is
(1− δ)s+ δEB[v]. (6)
But since s > EB[v]−c and δ > c
EB [v]−EG[v]+c , (6) is strictly larger than (5) and, hence, B could
profitably deviate by rejecting s. This is a contradiction.
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B Proof of Theorem 1: Equilibrium Properties
Before presenting our contraction mapping arguments for existence, we first establish properties
(a)-(d) of a reputation equilibrium via a series of lemmas.
B.1 Part (a): p > p∗∗
Lemma 5 Fix any δ, and consider any reputation equilibrium. For any p, player 2’s expected
payoff is at least EG[v].
Proof. Suppose not; so, for some p, player 2’s expected payoff is less than EG[v] − ε for
some ε > 0. Now, consider player 2 demanding EG[v]− ε
2
. By Lemma 2, G accepts this for sure
and B’s rejection yields EB[v] − c > EG[v] by Assumption 3. Thus, player 2’s corresponding
expected payoff is at least EG[v]− ε
2
. This is a contradiction.
Let S = EB[v]− (1− δ)c, and define δ¯ implicitly such that
S = (1− δ¯)EB[v] + δ¯fB(v)EG[v] + δ¯(1− fB(v))S, (7)
where v is the smallest element in V . Given Assumption 3, it is straightforward to see that
such δ¯ < 1 exists. Also, note that if δ = c
EB [v]−EG[v]+c we have
S = (1− δ)EB[v] + δEG[v]. (8)
Comparing (8) with (7), we see that δ¯ > c
EB [v]−EG[v]+c .
Throughout the analysis below, assume that δ > δ¯, and consider any reputation equilibrium.
Since δ > δ¯, Lemma 4 holds.
Lemma 6 For any p ∈ (p∗∗, 1), where p∗∗ = EB [v]−EG[v]−c
EB [v]−EG[v] , E
G[v] is demanded and accepted for
sure by both types and, hence, SG(p) = SB(p) = EG[v].
Proof. Fix any p > p∗∗. Let us proceed in the following steps.
Step 1 : EG[v] is the unique equilibrium demand.
Proof of Step 1. Suppose otherwise; so, there exists another demand s 6= EG[v] offered in
equilibrium. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: s < EG[v].
But then, by Lemma 2, G accepts s < EG[v] and, hence, SG(p) < EG[v], which contradicts
that SG(p) = EG[v] for all p.
Case 2: s > EG[v].
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In this case, by Lemma 2, G rejects s for sure and, by Lemma 4, s can be accepted by B
only if s = EB[v]− c. Note that player 2’s expected payoff from rejection conditional on player
1 being B is also EB[v]− c. Thus, by demanding s, player 2’s expected payoff is
p
(
EG[v]− c)+ (1− p) (EB[v]− c) ,
which, since p > p∗∗, is strictly less than EG[v]. This contradicts Lemma 5.
Step 2 : Acceptance of EG[v] will not reduce the posterior.
Proof of Step 2 : Let rG and rB denote the equilibrium rejection probability by G and B,
respectively. We need to establish that rB ≥ rG and rG < 1.










EG[v]− c)+ (1− rB)EG[v]]+ (1− p) [rB (EB[v]− c)+ (1− rB)EG[v]]
= prB
(
EG[v]− c)+ (1− p)rB (EB[v]− c)+ (1− rB)EG [v]
= prB (−c) + (1− p)rB (EB[v]− EG [v]− c)+ EG [v]
≤ p∗∗rB (−c) + (1− p∗∗)rB (EB[v]− EG [v]− c)+ EG [v] (because p > p∗∗)
=
EB[v]− EG [v]− c
EB[v]− EG [v] r




EB[v]− EG [v]− c)+ EG [v]
= EG [v] .
But this contradicts Lemma 5.
Next, suppose that rG = 1; so, from above, rB = 1. But then, since p > p∗∗, player 2’s
expected payoff is strictly less than EG[v]. This contradicts Lemma 5.
Step 3 : EG[v] is accepted for sure by both types.
Proof of Step 3. It follows from Steps 1 and 2 that, for any p > p∗∗, SB(p) ≤ EG[v];
otherwise, B can simply accept the equilibrium demand at every p > p∗∗. Since rejecting EG[v]
yields at best (1− δ)EB[v] + δEG[v] > EG[v], B must accept EG[v] for sure.
Finally, G must also accept EG[v] for sure. Otherwise, since B accepts this demand for
sure, player 2’s expected payoff is strictly less than EG[v]. This contradicts Lemma 5.
B.2 Payoffs and Strategies at p < p∗∗
Lemma 7 For any p ∈ (0, p∗∗], SB(p) ≤ S.
Proof. Suppose not; so, for some p ∈ (0, p∗∗], SB(p) > S. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: There is no serious demand.
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Note that rejected demands are not observable. Let X be B’s expected transfer from
rejection. By assumption, there exists some ε > 0 such that X > S + ε. Since every demand
is rejected, player 2’s expected payoff is
p
(
EG[v]− c)+ (1− p) (EB[v]− c) . (9)
Next, consider player 2 demanding EB[v]− c+ ε. G rejects this for sure and, by accepting,
B’s expected transfer is at most (1 − δ) (EB[v]− c+ ε) + δEB[v], but this is strictly smaller
than X and hence B would accept it for sure. Thus, player 2’s expected payoff from demanding
EB[v]− c+ ε is p (EG[v]− c)+ (1− p) (EB[v]− c+ ε), which is strictly larger than (9). This
is a contradiction.
Case 2: There is a serious demand.
By Lemma 4, the serious demand is either EG[v] or EB[v]− c. Thus, B’s expected transfer
from accepting a demand is at most (1− δ) (EB[v]− c)+ δEB[v] = S. Since rejected demands
are not observable, it then follows that SB(p) ≤ S.
Lemma 8 For any p ∈ (0, p∗∗), one of the following holds:
(i) SB(p) ≤ S, and there are only losing demands.
(ii) SB(p) = S, and EB[v] − c is the only serious demand, which B is indifferent between
accepting and rejecting. Furthermore, rejection by B must occur with positive probability and it
strictly increases reputation.
Proof. Fix any p ∈ (0, p∗∗). There are several cases to consider.
Case 1: EG[v] is the only demand.
Let rG and rB denote the equilibrium rejection probability by G and B, respectively. Player





EG[v]− c)+ (1− rG)EG[v]]+ (1− p) [rB (EB[v]− c)+ (1− rB)EG[v]] . (10)
Also, if player 2 offers a demand larger than E
B [v]




EG[v]− c)+ (1− p) (EB[v]− c) . (11)
Note that, since p < p∗∗, (11) is strictly larger than EG[v].
We now go through each of the following possible sub-cases:











EG[v]− c)+ (1− p) (EB[v]− c)]+ (1− rG)EG[v],
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which is less than (11) since rG < 1 and p < p∗∗. This implies that player 2 would not demand
EG[v], a contradiction.
(1.2) rB < rG = 1. Then, (10) becomes
p
(
EG[v]− c)+ (1− p) [rB (EB[v]− c)+ (1− rB)EG[v]] ,
which is less than (11) since rB < 1. Thus, player 2 would not demand EG[v], a contradiction.
(1.3) rB > rG ≥ 0. In this case, SB(p) is given by rejection and, since B’s future transfers
are bounded below by EG[v], we have
SB(p) ≥ (1− δ)EB[v] + δEG[v] > EG[v]. (12)
Also, since rB > rG, accepting EG[v] must improve reputation and, hence, monotonicity implies
that SB(p) ≤ (1− δ)EG[v] + δSB(p), or SB(p) ≤ EG[v]. This contradicts (12).





for some s 6= EG[v] is in the support of player 2’s equilibrium strategy.
In this case, clearly, it must be that s > EG[v] and hence, by Lemma 2, G rejects it for sure.
We proceed by considering each possible sub-case:
(2.1) B accepts s with positive probability. Then, by Lemma 4, s = EB[v]− c and, hence,
by Lemma 3, B accepts EG[v] for sure. Player 2’s expected payoff from demanding EG[v] is,
therefore, at most EG[v], which is less than (11) since p < p∗∗. This implies that EG[v] cannot
be demanded, a contradiction.
(2.2) B rejects s for sure. In this case, we can apply the same arguments as for Case 1 above
to consider each possible response to EG[v].
Case 3: EG[v] is not demanded.
If there is no serious demand, by Lemma 7, (i) holds. It then remains to show that, otherwise,
part (ii) of the claim holds. In this case, by Lemma 4, EB[v] − c is the only serious demand
and, by Lemma 2, only B accepts it. Since accepting this demand reveals B, the corresponding
expected transfer amounts to S. Let X denote B’s expected transfer from rejection. Clearly,
X ≥ S. We first show that SB(p) = X = S.
Suppose not; so, there exists some ε > 0 such that X > S + ε. Then, consider player
2 demanding EB[v] − c + ε. By accepting this demand, B’s expected transfer is at most
(1 − δ)(EB[v] − c + ε) + δEB[v] = S + (1− δ) ε < X and, hence, B must accept it for sure.
This implies that there exists a profitable deviation for player 2 from demanding EB[v] − c, a
contradiction.
Next, we show that rejection by B must occur in equilibrium. Otherwise, by Lemma 2,
rejection reveals G and, hence, yields the expected transfer (1− δ)EB[v] + δEG[v] < S, where
the inequality holds since δ > c
EB [v]−EG[v]+c . This contradicts that S
B(p) = S.
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Finally, since G rejects all equilibrium demands and B accepts EB[v]− c, rejection strictly
increases reputation.
B.3 Parts (b) and (c): p ∈ (p∗, p∗∗) and p ∈ (0, p∗)
Lemma 9 There exists some p∗ ∈ (0, p∗∗) such that SB(p) = S for all p ∈ (0, p∗) and SB(p) <
S for all p > p∗.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, by Lemma 8 and monotonicity, there are two cases to consider.
Case 1: SB(p) = S for all p ∈ (0, p∗∗).
Consider p = p∗∗ − ε for some small ε > 0. By Lemma 8, rejection weakly improves
reputation and, therefore, for sufficiently small ε, the posterior after the smallest realization of
outside option, v, must be above p∗∗. Thus, by Lemmas 6 and 7, we have
SB(p) ≤ (1− δ)EB[v] + δfB(v)EG[v] + δ(1− fB(v))S. (13)
But since δ > δ¯, the right-hand side of (13) is strictly less than S, a contradiction.
Case 2: SB(p) < S for all p ∈ (0, p∗∗).
By Lemma 8, in this case, there are only losing demands at every p ∈ (0, p∗∗). Then,
reputation is updated purely by the realizations of random variable v; i.e., for any pt ∈ (0, p∗∗),
the posterior pt+1 after v is given by Bayes’ formula (3) . Consider a stochastic process {pt}∞t=0
defined by the prior p0 ∈ (0, p∗∗) and Bayes’ formula (3). Let M (p0) be the probability with
which pt first reaches p
∗∗ in finite time. It follows from Lemma 1 in Appendix A.1 above that
limp0→0M (p0) = 0.
Next, since belief is updated purely by the realizations of random variable v from any
p ∈ (0, p∗∗), the (discounted average) expected payment SB (p0) is obtained by a sequence of
constant flow transfers with an expectation of EB[v] until the posterior reaches or exceeds p∗∗.
However, we have just shown that limp0→0M (p0) = 0. Then, limp0→0 S
B (p0) = E
B[v] > S, a
contradiction.
Parts (b) and (c) of Theorem 1 follow from combining Lemma 9 with Lemma 8. In addition,
we obtain the following.
Lemma 10 Fix p∗ as defined in Lemma 9. There exists pˆ ≤ p∗ such that part (ii) of Lemma 8
holds for any p ∈ (0, pˆ): EB[v] − c is the only serious demand, which B is indifferent between
accepting and rejecting, and rejection by B must occur with a positive probability and it strictly
increases reputation.
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Proof. Given an equilibrium value function SB (p) , observe that p∗ := sup
{
p : SB (p) = S
}
.
Define pˆ implicitly such that
p∗ =
pˆfG (v)
pˆfG (v) + (1− pˆ) fB (v) ,
i.e., p∗ is the updated posterior from pˆ if the realized signal is v.
Now, suppose the contrary of the claim; so, for all p ∈ (0, p∗), part (i) of Lemma 8 holds.
Fix any p ∈ (0, pˆ). By the definitions of p∗ and pˆ, and since only losing demands are made, the
posterior at the next period is bounded above by p∗. Thus,
SB(p) = (1− δ)EB[v] + δS > S.
But this contradicts that SB(p) = S.
B.4 Part (d): p∗ and p∗∗
Lemma 11 At p∗, rejection occurs for sure.
Proof. Suppose not; then, by part (ii) of Lemma 8, the serious demand must be EB[v]− c
and acceptance of this demand leads to the continuation payment equal to S. Also, rejection
strictly increases reputation, say, to p′. Putting together these facts, we obtain
SB(p∗) = S = (1− δ)EB [v] + δEB [Sα (pt+1) |pt = p′] = SB(p′) < S,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of p∗ and monotonicity of SB(p). This is
a contradiction
Lemma 12 At p∗∗, we have the following:
(i) EG[v] is the only serious demand.
(ii) If EG[v] is offered, it must be accepted for sure by both types.
Proof. (i) Suppose not; so, there is another serious demand, s. By Lemma 4, s = EB[v]−c.
Then, B accepts EG[v] for sure by Lemma 3. We also know that G rejects s for sure by Lemma
2. Therefore, rejection must strictly improve reputation. Thus, by Lemmas 6 and 7, B’s
expected transfer from rejection here is at most
(1− δ)EB[v] + δF (v∗)EG[v] + δ(1− F (v∗))S < S,
where the inequality follows from δ > δ¯. This contradicts that s is accepted in equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose not; consider the following two cases.
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Case 1: G accepts EG[v] for sure.
Then, B must reject EG[v] and, hence, given that this is the only serious demand, acceptance
must strictly increase reputation. Thus, by Lemma 6, the corresponding expected transfer for
B is (1 − δ)EG[v] + δEG[v] = EG[v], which is clearly less than that from rejection. This is a
contradiction.
Case 2: G rejects EG[v] with probability rG > 0.
Let rB denote B’s corresponding rejection probability. We know that p∗∗(EG[v]− c) + (1−
p∗∗)(EB[v] − c) = EG[v]. This implies that, if rB < rG, player 2’s expected payoff is less than
EG[v], which contradicts Lemma 5. Thus, rB ≥ rG and, hence, accepting EG[v] weakly improves
reputation and the corresponding payment to type B is at most (1 − δ)EG[v] + δSB(p∗∗) <
SB(p∗∗), where SB(p∗∗) must also be the payment from rejection at p∗∗ (which happens with
a positive probability) because EG[v] is the only serious demand and rejected offers are not
observable. This contradicts that rB ≥ rG > 0.
C Proof of Theorem 1: Construction
C.1 From Equilibrium to Contraction Mapping
Consider the reputation process {pt} governed by (3) in Appendix A above. Let FB(v) =∑
v≤v′ f
B(v′); as defined before, v∗ ∈ V is such that fB(v)
fG(v)
≥ 1 if and only if v > v∗.
Fix p∗∗ = E
B [v]−EG[v]−c
EB [v]−EG[v] . Let S be the set of bounded non-increasing real-valued functions
S : [0, 1] → [EG [v] , EB [v]]. We know that S is a Banach space under the supremum norm.
For each α ∈ [0, 1] , define an operator Tα on S as follows:
[Tα (S)] (pt) =

EB[v] if pt = 0
min
{
S, (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [S (pt+1) |pt]
}
if pt ∈ (0, p∗∗)
αEG[v] + (1− α)
[
(1− δ)EB[v] + δFB (v∗)EG[v]
+δ
(
1− FB (v∗))EB [S (pt+1) |pt, v > v∗]
]
if pt = p
∗∗
S if pt > p
∗∗.
The definition of Tα is motivated by the equilibrium properties derived in Appendix B above.
We explain the above definition of the operator in more detail below:
• If pt > p∗∗, by Lemma 6 above, the value function is tied down by the payoff boundary,
S = EG [v].
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• If pt = p∗∗, player 2 must randomize. Upon a losing demand, belief updating depends on
the realization of v and, hence, the corresponding continuation payment is given by
(1− δ)EB[v] + δFB (v∗)EG[v] + δ (1− FB (v∗))EB [S (pt+1) |pt, v > v∗] . (14)
Accepting the serious demand EG[v] leads to an immediate payment EG [v] and the
posterior pt+1 is unchanged at p
∗∗. The latter implies that, at the next period, player 1
again entertains random demands between EG[v] and losing demands, and therefore, only
EG [v] and (14) appear in computing the continuation payment. This in turn implies that
the equilibrium value at p∗∗ must itself be a convex combination of EG [v] and (14) . We
denote by α ∈ [0, 1] the coefficient on the former. Thus, α is one-to-one to the probability
with which player 2 demands EG[v] at p∗∗. Note that if δ > c
FB(v∗)(EB [v]−EG[v])+c , (14)
is bounded above by S = EB [v] − (1− δ) c. Therefore [Tα(S)](p∗∗) is just the following
expression appearing in the corresponding definition in Section 3.1 above:
αEG[v] + (1− α) [(1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [S (pt+1) |pt]] .
• If pt ∈ (0, p∗∗), by Lemma 8 above, either the first payoff boundary S binds, or the equi-
librium features rejection (which happens when pt ∈ (p∗, p∗∗)) and hence the equilibrium
value is given by (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [S (pt+1) |pt]. Therefore, by monotonicity of the
value function, for pt ∈ (0, p∗∗), the value must be
min
{
S, (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [S (pt+1) |pt]
}
.
• Note that Tα does not involve p∗, which is unknown and to be endogenized below. The
other threshold, p∗∗, is the unique point that makes player 2 indifferent and therefore we
take it as given in the definition of contraction mapping.
We establish the following properties of Tα for any α ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 13 For each α ∈ [0, 1] , Tα is a contraction mapping with a Lipschitz constant δ < 1.
Hence, Tα admits a unique fixed point Sα. Furthermore,
(a) Sα is non-increasing in α, i.e., Sα (p) ≤ Sβ (p) for all p whenever α ≥ β; and
(b) Sα is continuous in α in supremum norm.
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Proof. We first check Blackwell’s two sufficient conditions for contraction mapping.
(i) Monotonicity: Suppose S ≤ S ′. Then,
[Tα (S)] (pt) =

EB[v], if pt = 0
min
{
S, (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [S (pt+1) |pt]
}
if pt ∈ (0, p∗∗)
αEG[v] + (1− α)
[
(1− δ)EB[v] + δFB (v∗)EG[v]
+δ
(
1− FB (v∗))EB [S (pt+1) |pt, v > v∗]
]
if pt = p
∗∗




EB[v], if pt = 0
min
{
S, (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [S ′ (pt+1) |pt]
}
if pt ∈ (0, p∗∗)
αEG[v] + (1− α)
[
(1− δ)EB[v] + δFB (v∗)EG[v]
+δ
(
1− FB (v∗))EB [S ′ (pt+1) |pt, v > v∗]
]
if pt = p
∗∗





[Tα (S + a)] (pt) =

EB[v] if pt = 0
min
{
S, (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [S (pt+1) + a|pt]
}
if pt ∈ (0, p∗∗)
αEG[v] + (1− α)
 (1− δ)EB[v] + δFB (v∗)EG[v]+δ (1− FB (v∗)) ·
EB [S (pt+1) + a|pt, v > v∗]
 if pt = p∗∗




EB[v] if pt = 0
min
{
S, (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [S (pt+1) |pt]
}
if pt ∈ (0, p∗∗)
αEG[v] + (1− α)
 (1− δ)EB[v] + δFB (v∗)EG[v]+δ (1− FB (v∗)) ·
EB [S (pt+1) |pt, v > v∗]
 if pt = p∗∗
EG[v] if pt > p
∗∗
= δa+ [Tα (S)] (pt) .
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By the definition of Tα, its unique fixed point Sα satisfies:
Sα (pt) =

EB[v] if pt = 0
min
{
S, (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [Sα (pt+1) |pt]
}
if pt ∈ (0, p∗∗)
αEG[v] + (1− α)
[
(1− δ)EB[v] + δFB (v∗)EG[v]
+δ
(
1− FB (v∗))EB [Sα (pt+1) |pt, v > v∗]
]
if pt = p
∗∗
S if pt > p
∗∗.
(15)
Next, we derive the two stated properties of the unique fixed point Sα:
(a) Monotonicity of Sα in α.
For any S ∈ S, Sα = limn→∞ (Tα)n (S) . Note that by definition, if α ≥ β, then
Tα (S) ≤ Tβ (S) .
Hence, by monotonicity of Tα (in S; the first of Blackwell’s conditions above), and by the above
inequality, we have
Tα (Tα (S)) ≤ Tα (Tβ (S)) ≤ Tβ (Tβ (S)) .
Iterating the same argument, we obtain, for any n, (Tα)
n (S) ≤ (Tβ)n (S). Hence, Sα ≤ Sβ.
(b) Continuity of Sα in α.
Consider a sequence αn → α. We want to show that Sαn → Sα in sup-norm ‖·‖. We can
write
Tαn (S) (pt) =

EB[v] if pt = 0
min
{
S, (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [Sα (pt+1) |pt]
}
if pt ∈ (0, p∗∗)
αnE
G[v] + (1− αn)
[
(1− δ)EB[v] + δFB (v∗)EG[v]
+δ
(
1− FB (v∗))EB [Sα (pt+1) |pt, v > v∗]
]
if pt = p
∗∗
EG[v] if pt > p
∗∗.
Note that this differs from (15) only at p∗∗.
Then, by definition,
‖Tαn (S)− Tα (S)‖
= |αn − α| ·
∣∣(1− δ)EB[v] + δFB (v∗)EG[v] + δ (1− FB (v∗))EBv∗ [S (pt+1) |pt]− EG[v]∣∣





Therefore, for any ε > 0, there exists N such that, if n > N, ‖Tαn (S)− Tα (S)‖ < ε for any
S ∈ S.
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Since δ is a Lipschitz constant of the contraction mapping Tα, we have, for n > N ,∥∥(Tαn)2 (S)− (Tα)2 (S)∥∥ = ∥∥(Tαn)2 (S)− Tα (Tαn (S)) + Tα (Tαn (S))− (Tα)2 (S)∥∥
≤ ∥∥(Tαn)2 (S)− Tα (Tαn (S))∥∥+ ∥∥Tα (Tαn (S))− (Tα)2 (S)∥∥
≤ ε+ δ ‖Tαn (S)− Tα (S)‖
≤ ε+ δε
= (1 + δ) ε.
Thus, if n > N ,
∥∥(Tαn)2 (S)− (Tα)2 (S)∥∥ < (1 + δ) ε for any S ∈ S.
Now, fix n > N , and assume for the purpose of induction that, for any integer m > 0,
‖(Tαn)m (S)− (Tα)m (S)‖ <
(
1 + δ + · · ·+ δm−1) ε for any S ∈ S.
Then, we obtain∥∥(Tαn)m+1 (S)− (Tα)m+1 (S)∥∥
=
∥∥(Tαn)m+1 (S)− Tα (Tαn)m (S) + Tα (Tαn)m (S)− (Tα)m+1 (S)∥∥
≤ ‖Tαn (Tαn)m (S)− Tα (Tαn)m (S)‖+ ‖Tα (Tαn)m (S)− Tα (Tα)m (S)‖
≤ ε+ δ ‖(Tαn)m (S)− (Tα)m (S)‖
≤ ε+ εδ (1 + δ + · · ·+ δm−1)
= (1 + δ + · · ·+ δm) ε.
That is, for any m, and for any S ∈ S,
‖(Tαn)m (S)− (Tα)m (S)‖ <
ε
1− δ .
Thus, when n > N , ‖Sαn − Sα‖ < ε1−δ as m→∞. This proves the continuity of Sα in α.
C.2 From Contraction Mapping to Equilibrium
The family of fixed points {Sα : α ∈ [0, 1]} obtained in the previous section offers poten-
tial candidates for the equilibrium payoffs SB(p). To go from the contraction mapping to an
equilibrium, we need to identify the exact randomization at p∗∗. We proceed as follows.
C.2.1 Defining p∗ (α)
For each α ∈ [0, 1] , we define
p∗ (α) := sup
{




where Sα (p) is the fixed point of Tα. That is, p
∗ (α) is the supremum of p such that the upper
payment boundary is binding.
The next result guarantees that p∗ (α) is well-defined.
Lemma 14 For any α ∈ [0, 1] , there exists p ∈ (0, p∗∗) such that Sα (p) = S.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there does not exist such a p. Then by the definition
of Sα in (15) above, Sα (p) < S for all p > 0. Therefore, from the definition of the fixed point
Sα, the value of Sα (p0) for 0 < p0 < p
∗∗ is obtained by aggregating a sequence of constant flow
payoff EB [v] until the posterior belief reaches or exceeds p∗∗. However, from the martingale
convergence property established in Lemma 1, the probability of the latter event converges to
0 as p0 → 0. Then, limp0→0 Sα (p0) = EB [v] > S, a contradiction.
Then, by the definition of the fixed point and Lemma 14, we can immediately obtain that,
with sufficiently large δ (as required in Theorem 1), p∗ (α) ∈ (0, p∗∗) . By monotonicity, Sα (p) =
S for any p ∈ (0, p∗ (α)) . However, we do not know whether Sα (p∗ (α)) = S; as we see below,
this becomes relevant for our arguments.
C.2.2 Candidate Equilibrium Σα
For each α ∈ [0, 1] , let p∗ = p∗(α) = sup{p : Sα (p) = S}. Also, let p∗∗ = EB [v]−EG[v]−cEB [v]−EG[v] . Then,
consider the strategy profile Σα and associated belief system as follows:
1. Player 2’s strategy:
(a) At p = 0, it demands EB[v] for sure.
(b) At any p ∈ (0, p∗∗), it demands EB[v]− c for sure.
(c) At p = p∗∗, it demands EG[v] with probability x = α
1−δ+αδ ∈ [0, 1] and EB[v] − c
with probability 1− x.
(d) At any p ∈ (p∗∗, 1], it demands EG[v] for sure.
2. Type G’s strategy: for all p, it accepts s if and only if s ≤ EG[v].18
3. Type B’s strategy:
(a) At p = 0, it accepts s if and only if s ≤ EB[v].
18We could construct another equilibrium in which this type accepts EG[v] only at p ≥ p∗∗.
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(b) At any p ∈ (0, p∗],
- it rejects s for sure if s > EB[v]− c and accepts s for sure if s < EB[v]− c;
- it rejects EB[v]− c with probability r(p) = p
p∗
1−p∗
1−p ∈ [0, 1] .
(c) At any p ∈ (p∗, p∗∗), it accepts s if and only if s ≤ max{ξ(p), EG[v]}, where ξ(p) =
Sα(p)−δEB [v]
1−δ .
(d) At p = p∗∗, it accepts s if and only if s ≤ max{ξ(p∗∗), EG[v]}, where ξ(p∗∗) =
X−δEB [v]
1−δ and
X = (1− δ)EB[v] + δFB (v∗)EG[v] + δ (1− FB (v∗))EB [Sα (pt+1) |pt = p∗∗, v > v∗] .
(e) At any p ∈ (p∗∗, 1], it accepts s if and only if s ≤ EG[v].
4. Beliefs:
(a) The belief is updated by Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
(b) At any p ∈ (0, 1), the posterior belief assigns probability 1 to type B after acceptance
of a demand strictly higher than EG[v]; there is no change of belief after acceptance
of a demand lower than or equal to EG[v].
(c) At any p ∈ (p∗∗, 1), the posterior belief assigns probability 1 to type G after rejection
(which is off-path).
C.2.3 Verification
We next show that Σα is an equilibrium for some α in two lemmas. By the definition of the






L (α) := (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [Sα (pt+1) |pt = p∗ (α)] .
Lemma 15 The proposed strategy profile Σα and the associated beliefs form a reputation equi-
librium if and only if Sα (p
∗ (α)) = L(α) = S.
Proof. The “only if” part: Suppose that Σα is a reputation equilibrium. Fix any p ∈
(0, p∗(α)). At this belief, Σα requires that type B be indifferent between accepting and rejecting
EB[v]− c; furthermore, right after rejection but before the outside option, the posterior jumps
exactly to p∗(α). This implies that
SB(p) = S = (1− δ)EB [v] + δEB [Sα (pt+1) |pt = p∗ (α)] . (16)
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Moreover, Σα says that, at p
∗(α), rejection must occur for sure. This means that
Sα (p
∗ (α)) = (1− δ)EB [v] + δEB [Sα (pt+1) |pt = p∗ (α)] . (17)
Putting (16) and (17) together, we obtain that Sα (p
∗ (α)) = L(α) = S.
The “if” part: Suppose that Sα (p
∗ (α)) = L(α) = S. We claim that the fixed point Sα gives
the value function associated with Σα. This follows from the definition; only the value at p
∗∗
needs some explanation.
At p∗∗, the definition of Sα implies that
Sα (p
∗∗) = αEG[v] + (1− α)
[
(1− δ)EB[v] + δFB (v∗)EG[v]
+δ
(
1− FB (v∗))EB [Sα (pt+1) |pt = p∗∗, v > v∗]
]
.
Now, by the definition of Σα, player 2 demands E
G[v] with probability x = α
1−δ+αδ . Then, we
can re-arrange the above expression to obtain
Sα (p
∗∗) = x (1− δ)EG [v]+xδSα (p∗∗)+(1− x)
[
(1− δ)EB[v] + δFB (v∗)EG[v]
+δ
(
1− FB (v∗))EB [Sα (pt+1) |pt = p∗∗, v > v∗]
]
.
This is precisely the Bellman equation for type B’s expected payment at p∗∗ under Σα.
It remains to verify that Σα forms a reputation equilibrium when Sα (p
∗ (α)) = S. First,
consider player 2’s strategy. Recall that, at p∗∗, we have
EG[v] = p∗∗EG[v] + (1− p∗∗)EB[v]− c.
Thus, at this belief, player 2 is indifferent between offering EG[v], which is accepted for sure,
and a losing demand. Also, EB[v] is the payoff that player 2 can guarantee from type B
via the outside option. It is then clear that the short-run player’s offer is optimal against
player 1’s strategies at p > p∗∗ and at p ≤ p∗ (α) < p∗∗. For p ∈ (p∗ (α) , p∗∗), note that
ξ(p) < EB[v] − c (since Sα(p) < S) and, therefore, it is optimal for player 2 to make a losing
demand as prescribed.
Second, consider type G. Fix any (on- or off-path) history at which this long-run player has
to respond to offer s. Note that he expects the transfer EG[v] from the outside option; according
to the equilibrium, the continuation payment at the next period is also equal to EG[v]. Thus,
it is optimal to accept s if and only if s ≤ EG[v].
Finally, consider type B. We know from the “if” part of the proof of Lemma 15 in the main
text that the equilibrium payoff SB(p) is indeed given by Sα(p) if Sα (p
∗ (α)) = S. To show that
deviation is not possible, fix any belief p and any (on- or off-path) demand s. His strategies at
p = 0 and p = 1 are clearly best responses. Consider the following remaining cases.
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Case 1: p ∈ (0, p∗ (α)]
In this case, since rejected offers are not observable, right after type B’s rejection in the
candidate equilibrium the posterior is p∗ (α) , and hence his expected payment is
(1− δ)EB [v] + δEB [Sα (pt+1) |pt = p∗ (α)] = Sα (p∗ (α)) = S
where the first equality follows from the fact that rejection occurs with probability 1 at p∗ (α)
in the candidate equilibrium and the second inequality follows by the condition of Lemma 15.
Note that S is also the payment from accepting EB[v] − c and revealing type B. Hence, at
p ∈ (0, p∗], it is optimal for type B to accept s if and only if s ≤ EB[v]− c.
Case 2: p ∈ (p∗ (α) , p∗∗)
By definition, ξ(p) is the demand such that the continuation payment from accepting such a
demand and revealing type B is Sα (p) , where Sα corresponds to the value function computed
from the candidate equilibrium strategy of rejecting the on-path demand. If ξ(p) > EG [v] ,
accepting s ≤ ξ(p) is a best response. If ξ(p) ≤ EG [v] , then the candidate equilibrium calls type
B to accept s ≤ EG [v] , which is also type G’s strategy. Hence, the posterior will not change
after the acceptance of s ≤ EG [v] . Hence, acceptance leads to a payoff of (1− δ) s+ δSα (p) ≤
Sα (p). Hence, the candidate equilibrium’s prescription of accepting s is indeed a best response.
Case 3: p = p∗∗
Note that ξ(p∗∗) is the demand such that the continuation payment from accepting such a
demand and revealing type B is exactly X, i.e., the payment given by rejection according to
the candidate equilibrium. Hence, the same argument for Case 2 applies here.
Case 4: p ∈ (p∗∗, 1)
Clearly, it is optimal to accept s if s ≤ EG[v]. Suppose that s > EG[v]. By parts (b) and
(c) of the proposed beliefs above, accepting this offer leads to payment (1− δ)s+ δEB[v] while
the continuation payment from rejection is at most (1 − δ)EB[v] + δEG[v]. Thus, rejection is
optimal if δ > 1
2




, where the last inequality follows from the
assumption that EB[v]− EG[v] > c.
Given Lemma 15, the construction from contraction mapping to equilibrium is concluded by






where L (α) := (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [Sα (pt+1) |pt = p∗ (α)].19 The proof turns out to be non-
trivial. Note that although Sα is continuous and monotone in α (Lemma 13), as we alter the
parameter α the entire fixed point Sα shifts, including the value of p
∗(α).
Lemma 16 There exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that Sα (p∗ (α)) = L(α) = S.
19Note that L (α) may not be monotone in α even though Sα is.
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Proof. We shall prove the lemma by way of contradiction. Suppose that the lemma is
false; then, there are several cases to consider.
Case 1: For all α ∈ [0, 1] , L(α) > S.
Then, since Sα is decreasing in α (Lemma 13), we have
L(1) = (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [S1 (pt+1) |pt = p∗ (1)] > S.
Note also that S1(p
∗(1)) = min{S, L(1)} = S.
Let h = (v1, v2, . . .) denote a sequence of realized signals v and φ(p, h) the posterior updated
from p after h via Bayes’ formula (3). Then, letH be the at most countable set of finite sequences
of signals such that either φ (p∗ (1) , h) ≥ p∗∗ or φ (p∗ (1) , h) < p∗ (1) but neither of the two
inequalities will hold for any sub-history of h. Thus, by the definitions of the fixed point and
p∗(1), for any h ∈ H, S1 (φ (p∗ (1) , h)) is either EG[v] or S.20
Let Pr(·) be the probability measure over H induced by the signals. For any small η > 0,




> 1−η. Since φ (p, h) is continuous
and monotone in p, for any finite sequence of signals h = (v1, v2, ..., vn) ∈ Hˆ, we can find εh > 0
such that the following condition holds: for any p ∈ [p∗ (1) , p∗ (1) + εh], φ (p, h) > p∗∗ or
φ (p, h) < p∗ (1) for the first time along h. Let ε = minh∈Hˆ {εh} . Hence, [p∗ (1) , p∗ (1) + ε] ⊂
[p∗ (1) , p∗ (1) + εh] for any h ∈ Hˆ. That is, the interval [p∗ (1) , p∗ (1) + ε] reaches the same
stopping regions [p∗∗, 1) or (0, p∗ (1)) at the same time along any h in Hˆ.
By the definition of p∗(1), for any p ∈ (p∗(1), p∗∗),
S1(p) = (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [S1(pt+1)|pt = p] .
Therefore, for any p ∈ [p∗ (1) , p∗ (1) + ε] , we have
|S1(p)− L(1)| = δ





EB[v] ≤ δηEB[v]. (18)
Since L(1) > S, for η is very close to 0, (18) implies that S1(p) > S. But this contradicts the
definition of p∗ (1) .
Case 2: For some β ∈ [0, 1] , L(β) < S.
In this case, Sβ (p




= L (β) < S. Define α∗ := inf
{
α : L (α) < S
}
.
By Lemma 13, α∗ ≤ β. If L(α∗) = S, then the claim holds for α∗; so, suppose otherwise.
20When α = 1, player 2 demands EG[v] for sure, and hence, S1 (p
∗∗) = EG[v] by the definition of the fixed
point.
40
Case 2.1: L (α∗) < S.
(i) α∗ = 0
In this case, the argument is almost symmetrical to that of Case 1 above. A contradiction can
be derived by showing that S0 (p
∗ (0)− ε) < S for some ε > 0. Let H be the at most countable
set of finite sequences of signals such that starting from p∗ (0) , the posterior after any h ∈ H,
which we write as φ (p∗ (0) , h) , is such that either φ (p∗ (0) , h) > p∗∗ or φ (p∗ (0) , h) < p∗ (0) ,
but neither of the two inequalities will hold for any sub-history of h. It will be made clear later
that the strict inequalities in this statement are critical, as compared to Case 1.
In terms of payoffs, for any h ∈ H, S0 (φ (p∗ (0) , h)) is either S or S. Note that when α = 0,
S0 (p
∗∗) > S by definition of the fixed point. Again, let Pr be the probability measure over H





> 1−η. For any finite sequence of signals h = (v1, v2, ..., vn) ∈ Hˆ, we can find εh > 0
such that the following condition holds: φ (p∗ (0)− εh, h) > p∗∗ or φ (p∗ (0)− εh, h) < p∗ (0)
for the first time along h. The existence of εh is guaranteed by the continuity of φ (p, h) in p
from Bayes’ formula. The monotonicity of φ (p, h) in p moreover implies that the entire interval
[p∗ (0)− εh, p∗ (0)] reaches the same stopping regions (p∗∗, 1) or (0, p∗ (0)) at the same time
along history h.
Let ε = minh∈Hˆ {εh} . Hence [p∗ (0)− ε, p∗ (0)] ⊂ [p∗ (0)− εh, p∗ (0)] for any h ∈ Hˆ. That
is, the interval [p∗ (0)− ε, p∗ (0)] reaches the same stopping regions (p∗∗, 1) or (0, p∗ (0)) at the
same time along any h in Hˆ. Therefore, for any p ∈ [p∗ (0)− ε, p∗ (0)] , we have∣∣(1− δ)EB [v] + δEB [S0 (φ (p, v))]− (1− δ)EB [v] + δEB [S0 (φ (p∗ (0) , v))]∣∣
= δ





EB [v] ≤ δηEB [v] . (19)
If L (0) = (1− δ)EB [v] + δEB [S0 (φ (p∗ (0) , v))] < S, then when η is very close to 0, (19)
implies that
(1− δ)EB [v] + δEB [S0 (φ (p, v))] < S
for any p ∈ [p∗ (0)− ε, p∗ (0)] . But then by the definition of the fixed point, S0 (p) = S for any
p < p∗ (0) . This is a contradiction.
(ii) α∗ > 0
Then, by the definition of the fixed point, Sα∗ (p





α ∈ (α∗ − ε, α∗) for some small ε > 0. Let us proceed in the following steps as illustrated by
Figure 5.
• Sα∗ (p∗ (α∗)) ≤ Sα (p∗ (α∗)) < S. This follows from the continuity and monotonicity of Sα
in α (Lemma 13).
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= S. This follows from the fact that L (α) ≥ S by the
definition of α∗.
• p∗(α) < p∗(α∗). This follows from the two steps above because Sα(·) is a decreasing
function.
• For any p ∈ (p∗ (α) , p∗ (α∗)), Sα (p) < S = Sα∗ (p). This follows from the previous step
and the definition of p∗(·).
But since α < α∗, the last step above contradicts that Sα is decreasing in α (Lemma 13).
Case 2.2: L (α∗) > S.
Then, by the definition of fixed point, Sα∗ (p




= S. Note that β > α∗
such that L(β) < S. Then, by the definition of α∗, there exists a sequence {εn} with εn ↓ 0
such that L (α∗ + εn) < S and β > α∗ + εn. Let us proceed in the steps below as illustrated by
Figure 6.
• p∗ (α∗ + εn) ≤ p∗ (α∗) . This follows from the fact that Sα is decreasing in α.
• S > L (α∗ + εn) = Sα∗+εn (p∗ (α∗ + εn)) ≥ Sα∗+εn (p∗ (α∗)). This follows from the previous
step because Sα(·) is a decreasing function.
Now, by the continuity of Sα in α (Lemma 13), and since εn → 0, ‖Sα∗+εn − Sα∗‖ → 0.
Note that
Sα∗+εn (p
∗ (α∗)) = (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [Sα∗+εn (pt+1) |pt = p∗ (α∗)] .
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Thus, the previous steps imply that
S > (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [Sα∗+εn (pt+1) |pt = p∗ (α∗)]
→ (1− δ)EB[v] + δEB [Sα∗ (pt+1) |pt = p∗ (α∗)] = L (α∗) > S.
This is a contradiction.
D Proof of Theorem 2
D.1 Part (a): Limit Uniqueness
Let us begin with an outline of the proof. Fix the equilibrium payment of type B, SB. For
each fixed discount factor δ, we define an auxiliary decreasing, divergent, sequence of payment
levels, Wn, n = 0, 1, ..., such that W0 = S
B (p∗) and Wn ≤ SB (pn) for each n = 1, 2, ... ...
and Wn ≤ SB (pn) for some sequence of “sparse” belief levels, pn, n = 0, 1, ... starting from
p0 = p∗. We shall show that min
{
n : Wn ≤ EG[v]
} → ∞ as δ → 1. That is, for any finite n,
Wn is always above E
G[v] as δ approaches 1. Since SB (pn) is above Wn, we know that for any
n, pn < p∗∗ as δ → 1. Since the sequence, pn, n = 0, 1, 2, ... is “sparse” by definition, this is
possible only when p∗ is close to 0. This intuition is illustrated in Figure 7.
D.1.1 Auxiliary Process Wn
The auxiliary sequence of payments is defined via the following first-order recursive equation:
Wn = (1− δ)EB [v] + δ(1− fB(v))EB[v] + δfB(v)Wn+1, (20)
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where v ∈ V is the smallest (best) signal. Let W0 = SB(p∗), that is, type B’s equilibrium payoff
at the lower threshold belief p∗. It is clear that Wn is strictly decreasing and divergent.




pnfG (v) + (1− pn) fB (v) > p
n.
We first obtain the following two lemmas.
Lemma 17 For any n > 0, Wn < S
B(pn) whenever Sn > E
G[v].
Proof. Given W0 = S
B(p0), we prove the claim by induction. Suppose that Wn ≤ SB(pn)
and SB(pn) > EG[v]. By Theorem 1, the latter assumption implies that pn ∈ (p∗, p∗∗) where
only rejection occurs in equilibrium and, hence, we have






pnfG (v) + (1− pn) fB (v)
)+δ (1− fB (v))SB(pn+1)
(21)
Now we compare (21) with (20). By induction, Wn ≤ SB(pn). Moreover, SB(p) < EB[v] for
all p > 0. Hence, Wn+1 < S
B(pn+1).
Lemma 18 limδ→1 SB(p∗) = EB [v] (the limit exists and is equal to EB [v]).
Proof. Consider p∗−ε for some small ε > 0. We know from Lemma 10 that, in equilibrium,
rejection occurs at p∗− ε such that the belief weakly improves immediately after rejection, say,
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to p′. Thus, for small enough ε, there exists some v′ ∈ V such that, for any v < v′,
p′fG (v)
p′fG (v) + (1− p′) fB (v) > p
∗. (22)
We know that






p′fG (v) + (1− p′) fB (v)
)
= S. (23)
We also know that SB(p) ≤ S = EB [v] − (1− δ) c for all p > 0. Thus, (22) and (23) imply
that there exists some ε′ > 0 such that, for any p ∈ (p∗, p∗+ ε′), SB(p)→ EB [v], as δ → 1. By
monotonicity of SB(·), the claim then follows.
D.1.2 Limit of p∗ via Wn
Now, suppose that it takes N (δ) consecutive best signals to hit or exceed p∗∗ from p∗ in
equilibrium. Then, Lemma 17 implies that
N(δ) ≥ N̂ (δ) = min{n : Wn ≤ EG [v]} .
By standard formula, the solution to the first-order difference equation (20) is given by Wn =
b(1−an)
1−a + a
nW0, where a =
1
δfB(v)
and b = −1−δfB(v)
δfB(v)




















Note that SB(p∗) < EB [v] for any δ < 1 and by Lemma 21, limδ→1 SB(p∗) = EB [v] . Hence
lim inf
δ→1












It then follows that lim infδ→1N(δ) =∞ and, hence, limδ→1 p∗ exists and the limit is 0.
D.2 Part (b): Reputation Building Probability R(p)
Our idea is to use the success probability Q (p) of reaching p∗∗ before dropping to p∗ computed
from the generalized gambler’s ruin process to approximate the reputation building probability
R (p) . Observe that to compute R (p) , the overall reputation building probability, we need
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to consider the randomization at the low region (0, p∗] because even when reputation drops
below p∗, it could bounce back with positive probability. We shall show as p∗ → 0 the gap
between Q (p) and R (p) vanishes. Hence, we first need to derive some relevant properties of
the equilibrium at low beliefs, i.e., at p ∈ (0, p∗], where we know from Theorem 1 that type B
may sometimes accept an equilibrium demand and, hence, reveal himself. We first show that
the posterior belief upon a rejection at any belief p less than p∗ can be bounded above by p∗
and below by a constant that is independent of p. Using this, we then find a constant lower
bound of the total probability with which player 1 voluntarily reveals himself at any p < p∗.
D.2.1 Reputation Building via Randomization at p < p∗
For any p ∈ (0, 1) and any v ∈ V , define
φ1v(p) =
pfG(v)
pfG(v) + (1− p) fB(v) ,
that is, φ1v(p) is the posterior obtained from Bayesian updating upon signal v. Define recursively,




. Also, let φ−kv (p) represent the inverse of φ
k
v (p), that is, starting
from φ−kv (p), k consecutive realizations of signal v take the posterior belief exactly to p. Note
that, by the MLRP, there exists some v∗ ∈ V such that φ1v(p) > p if and only if v ≤ v∗.
Lemma 19 Fix any p ∈ (0, p∗], and suppose that rejection occurs at p. Let p′ be the posterior
immediately after the rejection but before the signal. Then, p′ ∈ [φ−1v (p∗), p∗], where v = minV.
Proof. Suppose not. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: p′ < φ−1v (p
∗).
Then, since SB(p) = S for all p ∈ (0, p∗), and by the definition of φ−1v (p∗), we have






p′fG (v) + (1− p′) fB (v)
)
= (1− δ)EB [v] + δS > S.
But this contradicts that SB(p) = S.
Case 2: p′ > p∗.
But then, since both SB(p) and SB(p′) are determined by the continuation payoff from
rejection, we have






p′fG (v) + (1− p′) fB (v)
)
= SB(p′) < S,
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where the last inequality follows from the definition of p∗. But this contradicts SB(p) = S.
With slight abuse of notation, for any p, let rB(p) denote the total equilibrium probability
of rejection by type B. We know from Theorem 1 that, if p < p∗∗, type G rejects all equilibrium
demands for sure.











as required by Lemma 19.
Let









Thus, y(p) gives a lower bound on the probability of acceptance (and revelation) at p.













(1− φ−2v (p∗))φ−1v (p∗)
=
fG (v)− fB (v)
fG (v)
.




) ≥ y (φ−2v (p∗)) = fG (v)− fB (v)fG (v) . (24)
D.2.2 Bounding the Probability of Revelation
Define %(p) as the aggregate probability with which, starting from p, type B reveals his type
in equilibrium. Also, for any p < p∗∗, let P (p, n, v) denote the posterior belief obtained from p
after a sample equilibrium path over n periods in which player 1 rejects the demand followed
by the realization of signal v in each period.
Lemma 20 There exists some η ∈ (0, 1), independent of p, such that, for any p ∈ (0, p∗],
%(p) ≥ η.
Proof. We proceed in following steps.
Step 1 : There exists a finite integer k, independent of p, such that φkv (p) < φ
−2
v (p), where
v = maxV and v = minV . (That is, k consecutive worst signals reduce reputation to a level
from which two best signals will not bring it back.)
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Hence, φkv (p) < φ
−2

































) > 0. (25)
Step 2 : Fix any p ∈ (0, p∗] and any integer k satisfying (25). We have







=: η ∈ (0, 1) . (26)
Proof of Step 2. Consider P (p, 2k, v), where k is given by (25) above and v is the worst
signal; that is, starting at p, consider the posterior belief after a continuation history of 2k
periods in which rejection followed by signal v happens in each period. There are two cases to
consider.
Case 1: P (p, 2k, v) ≤ φ−2v (p).
In this case, (24) above implies immediately that
%(p) ≥ (fB (v))2k y (φ−2v (p∗)) = (fB (v))2k fG (v)− fB (v)fG (v) . (27)




P (p, 2k, v)




























































However, by definition of k, φkv (p) < φ
−2










































































1− rB (P (p, n, v))) (fB (v))n n−1∏
`=0








1− rB (P (p, n, v))) n−1∏
`=0










rB (P (p, `, v))−
n∏
`=0





















where the last inequality follows from (30).
The statement of Step 2 then follows from (27) and (31).
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D.2.3 Success Probability Q (p) from Generalized Gambler’s Ruin























= 0, where the last equality follows from the fact that the expectation is taken
over fB(v). Hence, by Lemma 7.3.1 in Ethier (2010), ρ > 1.
We know that, in equilibrium, whenever pt ∈ (p∗, p∗∗), the realization of signal v ∈ V

















Let Q(p0) denote the “success probability” with which, starting from p0 ∈ (p∗, p∗∗), the posterior
belief pt hits or exceeds p










































Since p∗ → 0 as δ → 1 by part (a) of Theorem 2, we have λ∗ → −∞ as δ → 1. Since ρ > 1,









∈ (0, 1) and lim
δ→1
U(p0) = ρ
λ(p0)−λ∗∗ ∈ (0, 1). (33)
D.2.4 Connecting Q (p) and R (p) in the Limit
Now, in order to work out the overall reputation building probability R(p0), i.e., the probability
with which, starting from p0 ∈ (p∗, p∗∗), pt goes above p∗∗, we also have to consider the fact that,
once the belief goes down to the region (0, p∗], it may still bounce back. However, Lemma 20
shows that, at any such low belief, revelation occurs with probability at least η ∈ (0, 1) . Hence,
the interval (0, p∗) becomes absorbing with a probability of at least η. Using this constant, we
connect the success probability from the generalized gambler’s ruin with reputation building
probability in our game.
Lemma 21 For any p0 ∈ (0, p∗∗) , limδ→1R (p0) exists and limδ→1R (p0) = limδ→1Q(p0).
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Proof. Define Π = sup
{
R (p) : p ∈ [p∗, φ2kv (p∗)]} . This supremum may not be achieved
for any p, but, by definition, there exists a monotone sequence p′n → p′ such that R (p′n)→ Π.
(We first take a sequence of R’s and then since p comes from a compact set, we take a further
sequence of p′n). Then, we have
R (p′n) ≤ Q (p′n) + (1−Q (p′n)) (1− η) Π. (34)
To see this, first recall that Q(p0) represents the probability with which the belief reaches
p∗∗ before falling to the region (0, p∗]. Therefore, with probability 1−Q(p0), the belief falls to
some level in (0, p∗]. At such a belief, consider a sample equilibrium continuation history of
2k periods, where k is given by (25) in the proof of Lemma 20 above. We know from Lemma
20 that the aggregate revealing probability over such a sample history is at least η. With the
remaining probability 1 − η, the reputation building probability in the continuation game is
bounded above by Π for the following reason: (i) by Lemma 19, the posterior at the end of 2k
periods can be at most φ2kv (p
∗); (ii) if the posterior at the end of 2k periods falls short of p∗,
the reputation building probability in the continuation game must be less than Π because the
posterior must first bounce to at least p∗ but this can only happen in equilibrium if player 1
sometimes accepts an equilibrium demand.
Since L (p′n) ≤ Q (p′n) ≤ U (p′n), (34) can be written as
R (p′n) ≤ U (p′n) + (1− L (p′n)) (1− η) Π.
But since both L and U are continuous functions, taking limits of the above inequality, we
obtain Π ≤ U (p′) + (1− L (p′)) (1− η) Π, or
Π ≤ U (p
′)
1− (1− L (p′)) (1− η) . (35)
Note that p′ ∈ [p∗, φ2kv (p∗)] and L (p′) ≤ U (p′) ≤ U (φ2kv (p∗))→ 0 as p∗ → 0. Thus, as p∗ → 0,
Π→ 0.
Thus, since limδ→1 p∗ = 0, applying the same logic for any p0 ∈ (0, p∗∗) yields
lim sup
δ→1
R(p0) ≤ lim sup
δ→1
[Q (p0) + (1−Q (p0)) (1− η) Π] = lim
δ→1
Q(p0).
Note that R(p0) ≥ Q(p0) by definition. Hence,
lim inf
δ→1
R (p0) ≥ lim
δ→1
Q(p0) ≥ lim sup
δ→1
R(p0).
Therefore, limδ→1Q(p0) = limδ→1R(p0).
Lemma 21, together with equations (32)and (33) , proves part (b) of Theorem 2.
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D.3 Part (c): Payoffs
Let δ = e−r∆ for some r → 0. Consider the equilibrium belief process pt conditional on type
B. Fix some small ε > 0 (as ∆→ 0, the number of signals that could be observed in ε amount
of real time explodes) and p ∈ (ε, p∗∗). Denote by τ∆ the “real time” that it takes pt to move
out of (ε, p∗∗) in equilibrium.
Lemma 22 Fix any ε > 0. There exists some ∆′ > 0 such that, if ∆ < ∆′, we have τ∆ < ε
with probability at least 1− ε.
Proof. From part (a) above, we know that p∗ → 0 as ∆ → 0. Hence, there exists ∆′′
such that p∗ < ε if ∆ < ∆′′. Hence, whenever pt ∈ (ε, p∗∗) ⊂ (p∗, p∗∗) , Theorem 1 says that
only rejection occurs in equilibrium and, hence, belief is updated purely by Bayes’ rule. Note
that pt
1−pt is a martingale conditional on rejection occurring, and therefore, by the martingale
convergence theorem, pt converges almost surely. Clearly, it cannot converge to some p
′ ∈
(ε, p∗∗) since both ε and p∗∗ are fixed. Hence, since τ is finite almost surely, there exists N such




, and the claim follows.
By part (b) above, we know that, for any p0 ∈ (0, p∗∗), R(p0) → Q(p0) as δ → 1 (where
Q(·) denotes the probability of the belief first reaching p∗∗). With slight abuse of notation, let
R (p0, ε,∆) be the probability that, starting from p0 ∈ (ε, p∗∗), the belief reaches p∗∗ at the
end of time ε. Then, limε→0 lim∆→0R (p0, ε,∆) = limδ→1Q(p0). By Lemma 22, it follows that






E Proof of Theorem 3




, and c = 2µ∆
κ
. As before,





. Theorem 1 implies that there exists δ¯∆ such that a reputation
equilibrium exists if δ > δ¯∆. In particular, δ¯∆ is determined implicitly by (7) in Section B
above. The following guarantees that we can apply Theorem 1 in our parametrized model with
δ = e−r∆.
Lemma 23 There exists ∆ > 0 such that e−r∆ > δ¯∆ for any ∆ < ∆ and any r > 0.





∆ − (3 + κ+ (1− κ)µ
√
∆)δ¯∆ + 2 = 0.
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The only solution in (0, 1) for this quadratic equation for sufficiently small ∆ is
δ¯∆ =
(3 + κ+ (1− κ)µ√∆)−
√









3 + κ−√κ2 + 6κ+ 1
2
∈ (0, 1) .
Notice that e−r∆ monotonically converges to 1 as ∆→ 1. The lemma follows immediately.
Let φ1(p) = pq
pq+(1−p)(1−q) and, for integer k ≥ 1, define φk+1(p) = φ1(φk(p)) recursively.
Let φ−k be the inverse of φk. By the symmetry of signals, for any k and k + 1, we have
φk(p) = φ−1(φk+1(p)).
Consider the following second-order difference equation (SODE) for integer n:
Sn = (1− δ)EB[v] + δqSn−1 + δ(1− q)Sn+1 (36)
with initial conditions S−1 = S0 = S = EB[v]− (1− δ)c.
The explicit solution, for n ≥ 0, is given by
Sn = E
B[v] +K1
1 + (1− 4δ2q(1− q)) 12
2δ(1− q)
n+1 +K2






1− 1− 2δ(1− q)(




1 + 1− 2δ(1− q)(
1− 4δ2q(1− q)) 12
(EB[v]− S0) .




< 1 and EB[v]− S0 = (1− δ) c > 0 and hence K2 < K1 < 0; {Sn}
is a decreasing and divergent sequence.
Simple algebra shows that, given δ > δ¯ where δ¯ is given in (7) above for Theorem 1,
S1 > E
G[v]. Define N as the following integer, which is finite because {Sn} is divergent:
N = sup{n : Sn > EG[v]}. (38)
Note that N is a function of δ.
Now, we consider a reputation equilibrium.
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Lemma 24 Consider the symmetric binary model. Fix any ∆ < ∆, where ∆ is as in Lemma
23, and assume that SN+1 < E
G[v], where SN+1 is the (N + 1)-th value of the solution to (36)
and N is as defined by (38). Then, consider any reputation equilibrium with two reputation
thresholds p∗ = sup{p : SB(p) = S} and p∗∗ = EB [v]−EG[v]−c
EB [v]−EG[v] . We obtain the following:
1. For any p ∈ (0, p∗), rejection occurs such that player 1’s reputation immediately after
rejection is p∗; thus, rB(p) = p
p∗
1−p∗
1−p ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, SB(p∗) = S, and p∗ is uniquely
determined by p∗ = φ−N(p∗∗).
2. At p∗∗, there exists a unique probability x ∈ (0, 1) with which player 2 demands EG[v]
(which is accepted for sure).
Proof. 1. Let us first prove the first part of this lemma. Fix any p ∈ (0, p∗). We proceed
in the following steps.
Step 1 : Player 1’s reputation immediately after rejection, say, p0, is such that p0 ≤ p∗.
Proof of Step 1. Suppose not; so, p0 > p∗. There are two cases to consider.
First, suppose that p0 ≥ p∗∗. Then, since SB(p) = EG[v] for any p ∈ (p∗∗, 1), we have
SB(p) = S = (1− δ)EB[v] + δ(1− q)SB (φ1(p0))+ δqSB (φ−1(p0))




) ≤ S by monotonicity of the payoffs and δ > δ¯, we have a contradiction.
Second, suppose that p0 ∈ (p∗, p∗∗). By Theorem 1 of the main text, every equilibrium
demand is rejected for sure at p0 and, hence, given the definition of p∗ and monotonicity of
SB(p),
SB(p0) = (1− δ)EB[v] + δ(1− q)SB (φ1(p0))+ δqSB (φ−1(p0)) < S. (39)
But (39) contradicts that
SB(p∗ − ε) = (1− δ)EB[v] + δ(1− q)SB (φ1(p0))+ δqSB (φ−1(p0)) = S.
Step 2 : SB(p0) = S.
Proof of Step 2. Suppose not; so, SB(p0) < S. Given the definition of p∗ and Step 1, it
must then be that p0 = p∗. We have
SB(p0) = (1− δ)EB[v] + δ(1− q)SB (φ1(p0))+ δqS < S, (40)
while, for any p ∈ (0, p∗),
SB(p) = (1− δ)EB[v] + δ(1− q)SB (φ1(p0))+ δqS = S. (41)
54
Comparing (41) with (40), we derive a contradiction.
Step 3 : p0 = φ−N(p∗∗). That is, p0 is independent of p.
Proof of Step 3. For expositional ease, let pn = φn(p0). First, we show that p1 > p∗. To see
this, from Steps 1-2, we have
SB(p0) = (1− δ)EB[v] + δ(1− q)SB (p1)+ δqS = S,
which exactly pins down SB(p1) < S. Also, since δ > δ¯, SB(p1) > EG[v]. Thus, p1 ∈ (p∗, p∗∗).
Then, given Step 2, and using the symmetry of signals, we obtain
SB(p1) = (1− δ)EB[v] + δ(1− q)SB (p2)+ δqSB(p0)
= (1− δ)EB[v] + δ(1− q)SB (p2)+ δqS,
which pins down SB(p2), and so forth.
But by Theorem 1 of the main text, we know that SB(p) = EG[v] for all p > p∗∗ and
SB(p) > EG[v] for all p < p∗∗. Thus, it must be that SB(pn) = Sn only for positive integer
n ≤ N , where Sn solves (36) and N is given by (38).
Now, we want to show that pN = p∗∗. Suppose not; so, pN < p∗∗. Hence, at pN , rejection
occurs for sure and the corresponding equilibrium payoff must be such that
SB(pN) ≥ (1− δ)EB[v] + δqSB (pN−1)+ δ(1− q)EG[v]. (42)
On the other hand, from the recursive equation (36), we have




+ δ(1− q)SN+1. (43)
Thus, (43) contradicts (42) since we assume that SN+1 < E
G[v].
Step 4 : p∗ = p0 = φ−N(p∗∗). That is, the posterior after a rejection at p < p∗ is exactly p∗.
Proof of Step 4. Suppose not; so, by Step 1 above, p0 < p∗. Step 3 shows that p0 = φ−N(p∗∗)
regardless of p. So, if we take p ∈ (p0, p∗) , the posterior after a rejection is lower than p. But
this contradicts Lemma 8: rejection cannot reduce player 1’s reputation.




2. We know from Theorem 1 that, at p∗∗, EG[v] is the only possible serious demand and it
will be accepted for sure if offered, leaving the belief unchanged at p∗∗. Letting x denote player
2’s mixing probability on the demand EG[v], we can then write
SB(p∗∗) = SN = x
[
(1− δ)EG[v] + δSN
]
+ (1− x)X, (44)
where





X − (1− δ)EG[v]− δSN .
Note first that SN < X. This follows from comparing (45) above to the recursive equation
SN = (1− δ)EB[v] + δqSN−1 + δ(1− q)SN+1,
where, by assumption, SN+1 < E
G[v]. Also, we have SN > (1−δ)EG[v]+δSN since SN > EG[v]
by definition. Thus, x ∈ (0, 1).
The next lemma pins down the generic uniqueness of the reputation equilibrium.
Lemma 25 SN+1 < E
G[v] for all but at most countably many ∆ < ∆.
Proof. By the definition of N, SN+1 ≤ EG[v] = −µ∆. The lemma is equivalent to saying
that the set {∆ ∈ (0,∆) : SN+1 + µ∆ = 0} is at most countable. Note that N is a function of
∆. For each integer n = 1, 2, ..., consider Dn = {∆ ∈ (0,∆) : Sn + µ∆ = 0}. It suffices to





and c = 2µ∆
κ
, it follows from (37) that






[1− e−2r∆(1− µ2∆)] 12
][









[1− e−2r∆(1− µ2∆)] 12
][




Suppose 1 − µ√∆ 6= 0. Then, Sn is an analytic function of ∆; thus, Dn, the set of zeros
for Sn + µ∆ = 0, is at most countable (see, for instance, Theorem 3.7 in Conway (1978)). It
follows that ∪∞n=1Dn is at most countable.
F Proof of Theorem 4
F.1 Part (a)
In this parametrized model, p∗∗ = κ−1
κ
and p∗ = φ−N(∆)(p∗∗), whereN(∆) is defined in Appendix
E above. We know that N(∆)→∞ as ∆→ 0, but since the precision q is a function of ∆, φ
also changes with ∆. Lemma 26 below derives p∗ as a function of N and ∆ explicitly. Lemma
27 provides a sufficient condition for p∗ → 0 in terms of the speed of N(∆) → ∞. Finally, we
show that indeed this sufficient condition is satisfied.
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(κ− 1)(1− µ√∆)N(∆) + (1 + µ√∆)N(∆) .
Proof. The arguments in Appendix E above imply that p∗∗ = φN(∆)(p∗). To pin this









κ(1−µ√∆)+2µ√∆ . Thus, for


















































Since φ−N(∆)(p∗∗) = p∗, the claim follows.
In order to compute the limit of p∗ as ∆→ 0, we need to conduct a rate comparison.
Lemma 27 If N(∆)
√










=∞ and lim∆→0 p∗ = 0.







































= ∞ if N(∆) grows faster than 1√
∆











Now, to the first-order approximation, we obtain from (46) above:












Define N̂(∆) = sup{n : Ŝn > EG[v] = −µ∆}. Since Sn and Ŝn are both decreasing, and by
(47), it then follows that N̂ ≤ N for any ∆. Since ŜN̂(∆)+1 ≤ −µ∆, we obtain


































. Since N (∆) ≥ N̂ (∆), it
follows from Lemma 27 that lim∆→0 p∗ = 0. We show condition (48) below.





























2r + µ2) =
√





→√2r + µ2 > 0; similarly, since µ√∆+r∆−rµ∆√∆√
∆









→ log exp(µ) = µ.












2r + µ2 + µ > 0.
F.2 Part (b)
As in Appendix D.2, we use the success probability Q (p) for the gambler’s ruin process to
approximate the reputation building probability R (p) . The bound on the error terms for a
fixed discount factor obtained there continues to be valid. To compute the limit as ∆→ 0, we
apply the estimate on N (∆) obtained in Appendix F.1.
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F.2.1 Success Probability
Fix a prior p0 ∈ (p∗, p∗∗). As before, let Q(p0) denote the probability that, conditional on type
B, pt exceeds p
∗∗ before dropping below p∗ in equilibrium. Let dxe denote the smallest integer
larger than or equal to x ∈ R. By the gambler’s ruin result with symmetric binary signals (e.g.,































and take ∆→ 0.
Lemma 28 lim∆→0Q(p0) =
p0
(κ−1)(1−p0) .



































































































→∞ as ∆→ 0.
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1− p0 > 0. (50)










































































∞ as ∆→ 0. The claim then follows from (49).
























































)dz∗∗e = p0(κ− 1)(1− p0) ,





F.2.2 Reputation Building Probability
Next, recall from the proof of part (b) of Theorem 2 in Section D.2 that
R(p0) ≤ [Q (p0) + (1−Q (p0)) (1− η) Π] , (51)
where, from (26) and (35),
Π ≤ Q (p
′)
1− (1−Q (p′)) (1− η) , p

























We know that Q(p0) ≤ R(p0), and have already solved for lim∆→0Q(p0) in Lemma 28.
Thus, to show that indeed lim∆→0R(p0) = lim∆→0Q(p0) for any p0 ∈ (0, p∗∗), (51) implies that
it suffices to show that lim∆→0 (1− η) Π = 0.
With symmetric binary signals such that fG(v) = fB(v) = q, we have k > 2; without loss
of generality, let us set k = 3. It is easy then to check that η = q5(2q−1). Also, Π is increasing
in Q(·), which is itself increasing in p. Since we are considering an upper bound for R(·), let us
take p′ = φ2kv (p





















































It is straightforward to check that this goes to 0 as ∆→ 0.








































































































































































































32 · 2 · 6 =∞,
as required for lim∆→0(1− η)Π = 0.






, lim∆→0R(p) = lim∆→0Q(p) =
p
(κ−1)(1−p) (and the limit exists).
F.3 Parts (c) and (d)
To compute the value function in the limit, we deal with two issues. First, in the diffusion limit,
reputation building takes real time, and hence, a version of discounted reputation building
probability is needed. This is obtained through Lemmas 29 and 30. Second, the payoff at
exactly p∗∗ becomes critical. For generic ∆ > 0, SB (p∗∗) is not the same as EG [v] ; moreover,
for any p ∈ (0, p∗∗) , there will be ∆ such that p is non-generic in the sense that it is reachable
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from p∗∗ after a finite number of signals (see part (c) of Theorem 2). We consider a convergent
sequence {∆n} and corresponding sets of generic beliefs {Pn} (the computation of limiting
payoffs at these beliefs does not involve p∗∗). This is the content of Lemma 32. Finally, in
Lemmas 33 and 34 we show that the value function must be continuous in the limit, thereby
deriving the payoff limits for all p.
F.3.1 Discounted Success Probability
Fix p0 ∈ (p∗, p∗∗), and consider the random belief process {pt}. Define

























































1− 4q (1− q) δ2
2 (1− q) δ and ρ =
1−
√
1− 4q (1− q) δ2
2 (1− q) δ .
Moreover, ρ > 1 > ρ > 0.
Proof. The formula follows immediately from Theorem 7.1.7 in Ethier (2010), which
obtains the probability generating function for stopping times in the gambler’s ruin process.
Note here that the gambler’s ruin process in our model starts at t = 0, and hence, at τ , τ + 1




, it is straightforward to verify
that ρ > 1 > ρ > 0.
In order to compute lim∆→0 Qˆ(p0), notice that q is a function of ∆ as is p∗, which is
determined in equilibrium; thus, z∗ and z∗∗ change in ∆. We have shown in part (a) of Theorem
4 that p∗ → 0. The next lemma therefore holds for any p0 ∈ (0, p∗∗).
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∗+z∗∗−ρz∗+z∗∗ . The computation is done in two
steps.








Proof of Step 1 : We first show lim∆→0 ρz
∗




































where the last limit follows from Step 1 in the proof of Lemma 28, which utilizes the fact that,
as ∆→ 0, p∗ = 0 and hence z∗ → +∞.
Moreover, 0 < ρ < 1 < ρ by Lemma 29. Therefore, ρz
∗+z∗∗ > ρz
































= log(1 + µ
√





































∆)− log(1− µ√∆) .




























where K(∆) = 1− e−2r∆(1− µ2∆).
Since K(∆)
∆

































Substituting p∗∗ = κ−1
κ
into this and taking the inverse, we establish the lemma.
F.3.2 Discounted Payoffs







1− EB [δτ+1])+ SEB [δτ+11{pτ≤p∗}]+ EB [δτ+1SB (pτ ) 1{pτ≥p∗∗}] .
Proof. Our argument below adopts the idea behind the proof for Wald’s equation. Define
a random variable It as follows:
It =
{
1 if τ ≥ t
0 if τ < t
.
Note that pt is determined by v0, v1, ..., vt−1, the realized outside option payments up to t;
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1− EB [δτ+1])+ EB [δτ+1SB (pτ )]
= EB [v]
(
1− EB [δτ+1])+ EB [δτ+1SB (pτ ) 1{pτ≤p∗}]+ EB [δτ+1SB (pτ ) 1{pτ≥p∗}]
= EB [v]
(
1− EB [δτ+1])+ SEB [δτ+11{pτ≤p∗}]+ EB [δτ+1SB (pτ ) 1{pτ≥p∗}] ,
which completes the proof.
Now take a sequence {∆n} → 0. For each ∆n, there exists a set of beliefs Pn ⊂ (0, p∗∗) such
that (0, p∗∗) \Pn is countable, and each p ∈ Pn is not reachable from p∗∗ (and hence from p∗∆n)
via any path of signals. Let P = ∪∞n=1Pn. By definition, (0, p∗∗) \P is countable.


































Proof. Since p0 ∈ P, if the posterior belief enters the region [p∗∗, 1] starting from p0, it
cannot hit exactly p∗∗. Hence, SB (pτ ) 1{pτ≥p∗∗} = S1{pτ>p∗∗}. Recall that lim∆n→0 c (∆n) = 0,
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1− δ = lim∆n→0
EG [v]












































































defined on p ∈ [0, 1] is a discontinuous step function for any ∆. In
particular, SB (p∗∗) is determined by the short-run player’s randomization at p∗∗. We want to





is continuous everywhere in p.
Lemma 33 lim∆→0
SB(p∗∗)
1−δ = −µr .




explicitly as a function of ∆ (recall that p∗∗ is independent of ∆). Suppose to the contrary that













for sufficiently small ∆,




1−e−r∆n converges to some constant η > −µr as ∆n → 0.
For this sequence ∆n, we construct Pn and P = ∪∞n=1Pn, previously defined just above Lemma
32. Since [0, p∗∗] \P is countable, there exists a sequence {pm} ⊂ P such that limm→∞ pm = p∗∗.



















































1−e−r∆n → η > −µr .
Finally, we are ready to strengthen Lemma 32 to hold for any p ∈ [0, p∗∗].


































Proof. Since S1{pτ≥p∗∗} ≤ SB (pτ ) 1{pτ≥p∗∗} ≤ S (p∗∗) 1{pτ≥p∗∗}, it follows from Lemma 33
that lim∆→0
SB(pτ )
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